Nigel Sookram v The Queen (Grenada)

A co-accused’s guilty plea during a joint trial does not automatically require the jury to be discharged. The question is whether continuing with the same jury creates a particular unfairness, such as an unavoidable inference against the remaining accused or exposure to inadmissible and highly prejudicial evidence. Appropriate directions may cure prejudice. In a joint enterprise, a participant who knows that a co-participant may have a real gun and may use it accepts the risk of the resulting acts. Liability for an act going beyond the agreed or contemplated venture does not arise where the accused lacked that knowledge. A conviction must rest on the prosecution case and proof beyond reasonable doubt, not merely disbelief of the accused’s statement.

The appellant and Denzil Charles were jointly tried in Grenada for the murder of John Joseph during an attempted robbery. During the second day of the Crown’s evidence, Charles changed his plea to manslaughter, which the Crown accepted, and the trial continued against the appellant. The appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment. The Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal. Before the Board, he argued that the trial judge had been required to discharge the jury and that the joint-enterprise direction wrongly permitted a murder conviction based on Charles being the shooter. The central issues were whether the existing jury could fairly continue and whether the summing-up misstated or impermissibly applied joint enterprise liability.

The appeal was dismissed. The Board rejected both grounds of appeal.

1. Discharge of the jury. There was no automatic requirement to discharge the jury when Charles changed his plea. The issue was whether continuing with the same jury created a particular unfairness. Such unfairness may arise where the plea necessarily implicates the remaining accused, or where inadmissible and highly prejudicial evidence has been led against the co-accused. It may be avoided where the plea is admissible, appropriate directions substantially nullify its prejudicial effect, or there is another good reason to continue. The Board referred to R v O’Connor (1986) 85 Cr App R 298 and R v Fedrick [1990] Crim. L.R 403 as examples of cases involving particular unfairness.
2. Here, Charles’s plea caused no prejudice. The appellant’s own statement placed both men at the scene, masked and armed, and his presence there was part of his defence. The judge expressly directed the jury to disregard Charles’s guilty plea and to decide the appellant’s guilt solely on the evidence against him. A fresh trial was therefore unnecessary.
3. Joint enterprise. The judge was required to direct the jury on joint enterprise liability because the appellant relied entirely on his statement. The directions correctly distinguished between an act going beyond the agreed or contemplated venture, for which the other participant alone would be responsible, and conduct undertaken where the appellant knew that the other participant might have a real gun and might use it. In the latter circumstance, the appellant could be taken to have accepted the risk and adopted the resulting acts.
4. Although it was legally open to convict the appellant of murder even if Charles had fired the shot, neither the Crown nor the judge invited conviction on that basis in the relevant third option. That option arose only after rejection of the statement and required the jury to consider the Crown’s case, which was that the appellant himself had fired the fatal shot. The jury were also correctly directed that disbelief of the statement alone could not justify conviction.

• Privy Council: The further appeal was dismissed.
• Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal: The appellant’s appeal against conviction was dismissed on 12 March 2008.