R v Erik Muci

The discretion to discharge a jury after a co-defendant changes plea is exceptional. The question is whether continuing the trial would or could result in an unsafe conviction, assessed on the most prejudicial reasonable interpretation where relevant material admits more than one interpretation. A high degree of need is required, and appellate courts interfere only cautiously. A late guilty plea does not make a trial unfair merely because the co-defendant previously ran a cut-throat defence. Where the plea exposes that defence as false and the judge clearly directs the jury to disregard the co-defendant’s evidence and related submissions, the direction may cure the risk. The court must assess the particular facts, including admissibility and whether the defendant was disadvantaged by the timing of the plea.

Following a joint trial at the Central Criminal Court, the appellant was convicted by a majority of fraudulent evasion of the prohibition on importing cocaine and unanimously of being concerned in its supply. He appealed against conviction with leave.

A co-defendant pleaded guilty after the prosecution closing speech but before the defence closing speech, having previously run a cut-throat defence which implicated the appellant. The trial judge refused an application to discharge the jury and directed the jury to disregard the co-defendant’s evidence and related submissions. The central issue was whether the late plea, the evidence already given, related bad character material and alleged signs of injury made continuation of the trial unfair or the conviction unsafe.

The appeal was dismissed.

1. The power to discharge a jury must be exercised sparingly and only where there is a high degree of need. Where inadmissible prejudicial material has been disclosed, the question is whether continuing the trial would or could result in an unsafe conviction, assessed on the most prejudicial reasonable interpretation. A co-defendant’s change of plea does not automatically require discharge; the individual facts and any particular unfairness must be considered. The court relied on Winsor (1866) LR 1 QB 390, Docherty (1999) 1 Cr App R 274, Genese and Kaye [1998] Crim LR 679 and Sookram [2011] UKPC 5.
2. The relevant question was whether the late plea rendered the continuing trial unfair and the conviction unsafe. It was not enough that an earlier guilty plea would have prevented the co-defendant from participating in the trial. Before the plea, the evidence and cut-throat defences had been properly admitted. If the plea had not occurred, the dispute would have continued and created an additional danger for the appellant.
3. The late plea instead benefited the appellant. It exposed the co-defendant’s account as false, and the judge immediately directed the jury to disregard his evidence and related questions and submissions. That direction was clear and capable of being followed. The evidence was not comparable to inadmissible previous convictions or an inadmissible confession.
4. The appellant’s witness evidence was admissible and could properly be disregarded pursuant to the judge’s direction. The 2013 messages were properly admitted and could have been adduced by the prosecution under section 110(1)(d) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
5. The evidence about self-harm, bribery and threats formed part of the co-defendant’s false account and was covered by the direction to disregard his evidence. There was no suggestion that the plea was involuntary or equivocal. A separate direction was therefore unnecessary. Had voluntariness been in issue, it would have been a matter for the jury.
6. The trial judge had considered the relevant facts, assessed the risk of prejudice and addressed whether directions could cure it. Her reasons required no greater elaboration. She was right to conclude that the appellant was in a better position after the plea than he would have been had the co-defendant maintained his not-guilty plea.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — [2026] EWCA Crim 900 : appeal against conviction dismissed.
• Central Criminal Court — following a joint trial before Her Honour Judge Trowler, the appellant was convicted by a majority on Count 1 and unanimously on Count 2. He was sentenced to a total of 33 years’ imprisonment.