Hobson v Magee (t/a Team Magee)

An appellate court should be slow to interfere with findings of fact and credibility assessments made by a trial judge who heard the oral evidence. Whether a person contracted personally or for a company depends on what was objectively agreed; the company’s payment of expenses is not conclusive. Equitable set-off remains subject to legal limits and cannot ordinarily be claimed personally for payments made by a separate company without proof of agency or assumption of liability. A claimed share in later venture profits requires a binding agreement. An appellate court may uphold a finding of an oral agreement where the evidence, correspondence and conduct provide sufficient support, even if the trial judge’s reasoning is imperfect.

Patrick Magee claimed €30,000 arising from a failed boxing-promotion venture involving Dennis Hobson and companies associated with him. The claim initially proceeded against Fight Academy Limited and was later amended to include Hobson personally. After a three-day trial in the Manchester County Court, HH Judge Armitage QC found that Hobson had contracted as principal, had benefited from the Setanta payment, and had agreed that the money was due wholly to Magee. The judge gave judgment for Magee on contractual and restitutionary bases, rejecting Hobson’s proposed set-offs. Hobson appealed, challenging the findings on contractual capacity, the Setanta agreement, set-off, later promotional profits, the evidence and the judge’s treatment of the issues. The central questions were whether the findings were open to the judge and whether Hobson had any personal entitlement to set off the sums claimed.

The appeal was dismissed unanimously.

1. The appeal was substantially an attack on findings of fact and credibility. Where the trial judge has heard the oral evidence, an appellate court should be slow to intervene. The applicable principle was illustrated by Watt v Thomas [1947] I All ER 582, Floyd v Fairhurst & Co [2004] EWCA Civ 604 and Bond v Dunster Properties Limited [2011] EWCA Civ 455. Delay and shortcomings in the form of the judgment did not establish that the conclusions were unavailable on the evidence.
2. Whether Hobson contracted as principal or on behalf of Fight Academy Limited depended on what the parties objectively agreed. The judge was entitled to rely on inherent probabilities, contemporaneous documents, Hobson’s personal signatures and his loose distinction between personal and corporate obligations. The findings that Hobson contracted personally and that the relevant arrangements did not identify Fight Academy Limited as the contracting party were not to be disturbed.
3. Equitable set-off is flexible but has limits. Hobson could not personally set off the payment to McCullough because it was made by Hobson Metals (UK) Limited, and it was neither pleaded nor proved that the company paid on Hobson’s behalf. The same reasoning applied to expenses shown to have been incurred by Fight Academy Limited. Separate corporate identity had legal consequences.
4. The proposed joint venture concerning later fights had not matured into a binding agreement and had collapsed by the time of the relevant Munroe fights. Hobson therefore had no entitlement to a 50 per cent share of the later receipts.
5. There was sufficient evidence to uphold the finding that Hobson agreed that the €30,000 Setanta payment was wholly due to Magee. The correspondence was ambiguous but did not expressly controvert Magee’s position, and Hobson’s case had principally relied on set-off. The judge’s conclusion in contract and restitution was sufficiently supported.
6. The appellate court could determine the later-profit issues itself because the evidence was sufficiently clear, rather than remit them. The judge’s overall assessment of Magee’s credibility, based on the evidence, contemporary documents and inherent probabilities, remained open to him.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2012] EWCA Civ 116, the court dismissed Hobson’s appeal.
2. Manchester County Court: After a three-day trial in September 2010, HH Judge Armitage QC delivered reserved judgment on 12 April 2011 for Magee, awarding just over £24,000 after conversion, with interest and costs.