MA v Camden & Ors

Revocation of a placement order requires the court to decide which arrangement best serves the child’s welfare throughout life. That is a holistic judgment, not a single threshold inquiry into whether parental rehabilitation has a real or significant prospect.

Past facts are established on the balance of probabilities. Future rehabilitation and parenting are assessed by prediction, risk and uncertainty; those uncertainties remain part of the overall welfare evaluation. The required degree of confidence is fact-sensitive. It may be high where delay threatens a child’s only realistic adoption opportunity, the child needs prompt permanence, and a failed return would cause further instability. A court may therefore reject an adjournment to await therapy where the evidence does not permit a reliable short-term assessment.

Two brothers were made subject to care and placement orders under section 24 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 in September 2011. Neither parent appealed. After prospective adopters were identified, the mother applied to revoke the placement orders, relying on her recovery from alcohol dependence and proposed psychotherapy. HHJ Brasse dismissed the application on 17 August 2012, holding that the children could not wait while the prospects of rehabilitation remained uncertain.

The mother appealed, arguing that the judge should have adjourned the decision and had applied too high a test by requiring high confidence in successful rehabilitation. The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence and considered whether the original decision should be set aside or remitted. The central question was which arrangement best served the children’s welfare throughout their lives.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the refusal to revoke the placement orders. Fresh evidence concerning the mother’s psychotherapy was admitted because it was credible, unavailable in time for the hearing and potentially capable of affecting the outcome. It did not alter the result.
2. The governing question under section 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 was which solution was in the children’s best interests throughout their lives. That required a judgment across a range of factors, including the parental relationship, the children’s history, delay, the prospects of successful rehabilitation, and the consequences of a failed return. It was not a single question whether the mother had a real, good or significant prospect of parenting safely within the available period.
3. Past facts had to be established on the balance of probabilities. Future events required an assessment of risks, possibilities, probabilities and confidence. The uncertainties did not fall away after a probability finding; they remained relevant to the overall welfare judgment. Black LJ’s observations, drawing on In re B (Children) [2009] 1 AC 11, In re H (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] AC 563 and In re M and R [1996] 4 All ER 239, reinforced that distinction.
4. There was no fixed level of confidence required in every case. The degree of confidence reasonably required could be higher where the children had suffered instability, needed prompt permanence, and risked losing their only realistic opportunity for joint adoption. The judge was entitled to reject a “wait and see” adjournment because further delay was likely to prejudice the children and the proposed therapy offered no reliable short-term prognosis.
5. The prospects of recovery from alcohol dependence and the development of parental insight were separate issues. Even an optimistic view of abstinence would not resolve the mother’s continuing lack of insight into the children’s needs. The new report, prepared without the full case material and after only a short period of intensive work, did not establish the necessary change.
6. The judge had properly balanced the loss of the original family against the proposed adopters’ capacity to provide security and stability. No evidence showed that the adopters’ sexual orientation or their being men would cause difficulty for the children. No further remittal or delay was ordered.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): in [2012] EWCA Civ 1340, unanimously dismissed the appeal and upheld the refusal to revoke the placement orders.
• Principal Registry of the Family Division: HHJ Brasse dismissed the mother’s revocation application on 17 August 2012 in case FD 12 Z 00234.
• Principal Registry of the Family Division: in September 2011, HHJ Brasse made care and placement orders in respect of both children. Neither parent appealed those orders.