A (A Child)

Permission to appeal against an adoption order should be refused where the proposed grounds disclose no reasonable prospect of overturning carefully investigated findings of fact, and no reasonable argument that the first-instance judge adopted the wrong process or acted outside the ambit of discretion. Earlier care and adoption decisions do not exhaust the judge’s duty to assess the child’s welfare. The judge must consider independently whether placement with the parent would serve that welfare, while being entitled to investigate and give appropriate weight to the earlier proceedings. Where those matters have been fully examined and the conclusion that adoption is required is open on the evidence, permission should not be granted.

The applicant mother sought permission to appeal against an adoption order made by Mostyn J in relation to her six-year-old daughter. The child had been in foster care in Scotland from infancy and was placed with the proposed adopter in England. Scottish children’s hearings had approved adoption following further investigation, and the mother’s appeal to the Sheriff had been dismissed.

At the English adoption hearing, the mother challenged the validity and Convention compliance of the Scottish proceedings, alleged that the child was being mistreated, and argued that she herself could care for the child. Mostyn J heard extensive evidence, including evidence about the Scottish system, the proposed adopter, social-work reports and the guardian’s reports. He concluded that adoption served the child’s welfare and dispensed with parental consent. The central question was whether there was a reasonable basis for appealing that decision.

1. Application refused. The mother’s application for permission to appeal was refused.
2. Findings about the proposed adopter. The allegation that the child had been mistreated was fully explored by Mostyn J. He recalled the adopter to obtain further evidence and made a clear finding that the conduct complained of amounted to no more than normal discipline. There was no reasonable prospect of successfully appealing that finding.
3. Independent welfare assessment. Although the question whether the child could return to the mother had been considered repeatedly in Scotland, Mostyn J did not treat the Scottish decisions as determinative. He investigated the reliability of the Scottish process, ordered disclosure of substantial records, heard evidence from the Scottish social worker and an expert, and considered whether rehabilitation remained a realistic prospect.
4. Evidence relevant to adoption. The judge also considered the English guardian’s reports, the child’s relationship with the adopter, the absence of a relationship between the child and her parents for many years, and the evidence concerning the child’s welfare. On that evidence, he was entitled to conclude that adoption was required and to dispense with parental consent under English adoption law.
5. Permission threshold. On reviewing the decision, the Court of Appeal found no reasonable argument that the two-part hearing involved a wrong process or that the adoption decision fell outside the ambit of the judge’s discretion. The mother’s other complaints, including alleged procedural defects and failures to investigate, did not establish an arguable basis for an appeal.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division). On 11 December 2012, the court refused the mother’s application for permission to appeal: [2012] EWCA Civ 1890.
2. Principal Registry Family Division. Mostyn J made an adoption order on 30 August 2012, having concluded that the child’s welfare demanded adoption and dispensing with the parents’ consent.
3. Scottish proceedings. Scottish children’s hearings approved adoption after further investigation. The mother’s appeal against that decision was dismissed by the Sheriff.