Reddy v The General Medical Council

An appeal from a county court decision made in its statutory appellate capacity is a second appeal, even where the decisive issue arose for the first time in that court.

A court cannot extend a statutory time limit for commencing an appeal unless legislation confers that power. Its procedural power to extend time applies only to limits imposed by rules, practice directions or court orders. Until an effective appellant’s notice is filed, there are no proceedings in which that procedural power can operate.

A document filed on the wrong form may commence an appeal if it contains the necessary information and objectively communicates an intention to commence appeal proceedings. An appeal brought after an unextendable statutory deadline falls outside the court’s jurisdiction.

The appellant applied unsuccessfully to the General Medical Council for entry on the Specialist Medical Register as a general surgeon. Following the transitional application of the General and Specialist Medical Practice (Education, Training and Qualifications) Order 2010, a Registration Appeals Panel dismissed his appeal. Paragraph 5(1) of Schedule 3A to the Medical Act 1983 allowed 28 days for an appeal to the county court.

Within that period the appellant filed an application notice seeking additional time to obtain advice and prepare grounds. He filed an appellant’s notice after the period had expired. The Central London County Court held that it could neither extend the statutory period nor entertain the late appeal, and dismissed it.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the proposed appeal was a first or second appeal, whether the application notice had commenced an appeal, whether the statutory period could be extended, and whether the county court had jurisdiction over a late appeal.

1. Permission to appeal refused. The proposed appeal was a second appeal. The county court possessed only statutory appellate jurisdiction and had made a decision on the appeal by determining a preliminary issue capable of disposing of it. An issue first raised and decided in the appellate court does not turn a further appeal on that issue into a first appeal. Article 5 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 (Destination of Appeals) Order 2000 therefore directed the appeal to the Court of Appeal, subject to CPR 52.13.

2. The application notice filed within 28 days did not commence an appeal. Use of the wrong form would not necessarily have been fatal if the document had contained the necessary information and objectively informed the court and respondent that appeal proceedings were being commenced. This document instead sought time to decide whether to pursue an appeal. It did not identify the challenged determination precisely or state grounds of appeal.

3. Paragraph 5(1) of Schedule 3A to the Medical Act 1983 imposed a statutory 28-day limit. Following Mucelli v Government of Albania [2009] UKHL 2, the court had no power to extend that limit in the absence of statutory authority. CPR 3.1(2)(a) permits extensions of periods fixed by rules, practice directions or court orders, but not periods fixed by statute. Moreover, before an effective appellant’s notice is filed, no proceedings exist in which the court can exercise its procedural powers.

4. The word “may” in paragraph 5(1) conferred a right of appeal, while the intervening words limited the period within which that right could be exercised. The change from the word “must” in the predecessor provision did not preserve a procedural power to extend time or merely substitute 28 days for the ordinary CPR period.

5. The fixed period was compatible with the identified Convention rights. The statutory procedure provided a full opportunity to challenge an adverse professional registration decision, and 28 days was not unreasonably short. Because the late appeal could not lawfully be entertained without ignoring or extending the statutory requirement, the county court lacked jurisdiction over it, although it retained power to determine whether jurisdiction existed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Held that the proposed appeal was a second appeal, but that it was bound to fail because the county court could not extend the statutory time limit or entertain the late appeal. Permission to appeal was refused: [2012] EWCA Civ 310.

• Central London County Court: His Honour Judge Hand QC held that the statutory time limit could not be extended and that the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the late appeal. The appeal was dismissed.

• Registration Appeals Panel: Dismissed the appellant’s challenge to the refusal of specialist registration.