Pope v R.

A jury’s verdict has constitutional primacy. An appellate court cannot quash a conviction merely because it has a subjective concern about the result. The lurking doubt principle, identified in Cooper [1969] 1 QB 267, requires reasoned analysis of the evidence, the trial process, or both, leading inexorably to the conclusion that the conviction is unsafe.

The jurisdiction is exceptional, especially where the appeal only invites a re-examination of material already considered by a properly directed jury. Where the evidence supports the jury’s rejection of an innocent explanation for forensic evidence and of a realistic alternative perpetrator, the conviction remains safe.

The appellant was convicted of murdering Karen Skipper after a retrial before Roderick Evans J and a jury at Newport Crown Court on 21 July 2011. The prosecution relied principally on DNA evidence showing that the appellant’s blood was present on the deceased’s jeans and knickers.

The appellant said that his blood had been innocently transferred when he assisted one of the deceased’s dogs about three weeks before the murder. He also maintained that her former husband, Mr Skipper, or another person may have been the killer. A previous appeal had succeeded and a fresh trial was ordered: [2010] EWCA Crim 2499.

The present appeal challenged only the safety of the retrial conviction under the lurking doubt principle. The central issues were whether the jury could safely reject the appellant’s account of the bloodstains and exclude a realistic possibility that another person committed the murder.

1. Appeal dismissed. The conviction was safe. The trial was flawless, the summing up was fair and comprehensive, and the jury’s verdict was supported by the evidence.
2. In a jury trial, the responsibility for the verdict lies constitutionally with the jury. Where there is a case to answer and the jury has been properly directed, the Court of Appeal cannot quash a conviction on a collective and subjective judicial hunch. The lurking doubt principle identified in Cooper [1969] 1 QB 267 requires reasoned analysis of the evidence or trial process which leads inexorably to the conclusion that the conviction is unsafe. It is available only exceptionally, particularly where the court is asked only to reconsider material placed before the jury.
3. The forensic evidence established that the bloodstains on the deceased’s clothing came from the appellant. The jury was entitled to reject his innocent-transfer account. That account depended on the deceased neither washing the relevant items during the intervening weeks nor wearing the same unwashed jeans and knickers on the night of the murder. The location, absence of associated staining and rapid drying of the blood also undermined the account.
4. The jury was also entitled to reject the contention that Mr Skipper, or another person, may have been the killer. The case alleging Mr Skipper’s responsibility had been fully explored, while the evidence against the appellant was powerful. There was therefore no reasoned basis for concluding that the conviction should be quashed by applying the lurking doubt principle.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Dismissed the appellant’s appeal against his retrial conviction in the present judgment, [2012] EWCA Crim 2241.
2. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the appellant’s earlier appeal against conviction and ordered a fresh trial, [2010] EWCA Crim 2499.
3. Newport Crown Court: Roderick Evans J and a jury convicted the appellant of murder on 21 July 2011 following the fresh trial.
4. Crown Court: Davis J and a jury convicted the appellant at his first trial in January 2009.