Williams v R.

A Brown direction is required only where the prosecution advances genuinely alternative bases for guilt and there is a real risk that jurors may reach a verdict by relying on different bases. Its necessity depends on the charge, the evidence, the defence, and the live issues. Repeated acts within a specimen count do not by themselves require that direction.

A Lucas direction is required where an alleged lie is relied on as evidence of guilt, or where there is a real risk that the jury will use it in that way. It is unnecessary where an inconsistency is relevant only to general credibility and is peripheral to guilt. A limited expert reference to research may fairly support an experienced practitioner’s opinion that the absence of genital injury neither confirms nor refutes penetration.

Williams v R was an appeal against convictions at the Inner London Crown Court for two counts of rape. The appellant was sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment. The jury had been unable to reach a verdict on a third count of anal rape, which was left on the file.

The prosecution alleged repeated non-consensual oral and vaginal penetration during one night. The defence admitted oral sexual activity but contended that it was consensual, and denied vaginal or anal intercourse.

The appeal challenged the admission and handling of medical evidence referring briefly to research on genital injury, the directions on specimen counts and alleged lies, and alleged deficiencies concerning telephone records and cross-examination. The central questions were whether any direction or evidential ruling rendered the convictions unsafe.

1. Appeal dismissed. None of the five grounds rendered the convictions unsafe.

2. The brief reference in Dr Mostyn’s evidence to the Bowyer and Dalton paper was not unfair or misleading. The paper itself was not placed before the jury. The passage read to them accurately referred to women who reported rape, and the doctor’s opinion was independently founded on her substantial clinical experience. The judge’s answer to the jury’s question sufficiently preserved that distinction. Although a further clarification would with hindsight have been preferable, the point was not material in the trial and no unfair prejudice arose.

3. No Brown direction was needed for the specimen counts. The counts did not specify alternative ingredients or alternative forms of conduct which could produce a fragmented verdict. They concerned the same parties, place and night, with the same defence. For oral rape, the issue was consent; for vaginal rape, the issue was whether intercourse had occurred. The ordinary direction that each count required a separate verdict was sufficient.

4. No full Lucas direction was required. The Crown had not invited the jury to treat the appellant’s inconsistent accounts of smoking crack cocaine as a lie demonstrating guilt. The issue was used as part of the broader assessment of credibility and was peripheral. There was no real danger that the jury would reason that a lie about drug use proved rape, and the judge fairly put the appellant’s explanation for the inconsistency.

5. The absence of telephone records was speculative and peripheral. Even records showing calls to a cab driver would not establish their content or directly resolve consent or penetration. The appellant had also elected to continue after the cab driver’s evidence. The criticism of cross-examination identified no matter capable of affecting the safety of the verdicts.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Williams v R, [2012] EWCA Crim 2516. The appeal against conviction was dismissed.
• Inner London Crown Court: The appellant was convicted on 16 April 2010 of two counts of rape and sentenced on 13 September 2010 to 13 years’ imprisonment. No citation was supplied.