Cardwell, R. v

A discretionary life sentence under section 225 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 requires a statutory assessment that the particular offender presents a significant risk of serious harm from further specified offences. Serious firearms offending may make such a sentence appropriate for consideration, but its gravity does not itself establish dangerousness.

Sentencing guidance for grave gun crime supplements rather than replaces the statutory assessment. The court must evaluate all available material about the individual offender. Where the significant-risk threshold is not met, neither a life sentence nor an indeterminate sentence is justified, even though the offending warrants a very lengthy determinate sentence.

The appellant was convicted at Liverpool Crown Court of conspiracy to possess firearms with intent to enable others to endanger life. He was also convicted of conspiracies to import and transfer prohibited firearms. He received a life sentence with a minimum term of 11 years on the principal count, with no separate penalty on the other counts.

The conspiracies involved the importation of 81 semi-automatic handguns from the United States and their intended sale to criminals on Merseyside. More than 50 firearms remained in unlawful circulation.

The appeal concerned whether the judge had adequately justified imposing life imprisonment rather than a very lengthy determinate term, in particular by making a proper assessment of dangerousness.

1. Appeal allowed. The life sentence was manifestly excessive. A determinate sentence of 22 years was substituted for the sentence on the principal count.

2. The court agreed that the offending was extremely grave and required a deterrent sentence. It also agreed that 22 years was the appropriate notional determinate sentence.

3. The guidance in R v Wilkinson & Ors [2010] 1 Cr App R(S) 100 was relevant. In serious firearms supply cases, life imprisonment or an indeterminate sentence may properly arise for consideration. However, that guidance supplemented the statutory process under the Criminal Justice Act 2003; it did not replace it.

4. Dangerousness could not be inferred from the seriousness of the offences alone. The court had to determine, under section 229, whether this particular offender presented a significant risk that members of the public would suffer serious harm through further specified offences. Although the gravity of the firearms offending was highly significant, the statutory test remained unchanged and had to be applied to the individual offender.

5. On all the material available to the sentencing judge, the significant-risk threshold was not established. The appellant's offending therefore did not justify either a discretionary life sentence or imprisonment for public protection.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): sentence appeal allowed; life sentence replaced with a determinate sentence of 22 years: [2012] EWCA Crim 3030.
• Liverpool Crown Court: appellant convicted on 10 November 2011 and sentenced to life imprisonment with an 11-year minimum term. No lower-court citation was stated.