Edwards (Formerly Steadman) v R

A conviction is not unsafe merely because material concerning a prosecution witness’s informant status and expected advantage was not disclosed. The appellate court must assess whether full disclosure would have materially altered the jury’s task in evaluating that witness and the safety of the verdict. Where the jury had already been directed to approach the witness with caution, and the circumstances and detail of the original account strongly supported its true source, the non-disclosure will not render the conviction unsafe. A proposed fresh-evidence ground founded on a witness’s retraction fails where the retraction is found manifestly untrue.

The appellant was convicted at Maidstone Crown Court of murder and unlawful concealment, disposal or destruction of the deceased’s body. His first appeal, concerning the admission of his co-accused’s conviction, was dismissed.

The Criminal Cases Review Commission referred the convictions on the ground that material relevant to Roy Kearney’s credibility had not been fully disclosed. Kearney had given evidence of admissions made by the appellant, but his status as a registered informant and his expectation of sentencing assistance had not been disclosed. The appellant also sought leave to advance a fresh-evidence ground based on Kearney’s later retraction of his trial evidence.

The central issues were whether the retraction was credible and whether the non-disclosure rendered the convictions unsafe.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court refused leave to advance the proposed fresh-evidence ground and dismissed the appeal on the CCRC reference.

2. The court admitted Kearney’s oral evidence under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. It found his account that prison and police officers had induced him to fabricate evidence to be manifestly untrue. His contemporaneous letter volunteering information, the extensive detail in his original statement, including information unavailable from the alleged sources, and the evidence of the officers made the retraction implausible. His later correspondence with a police officer was also inconsistent with the asserted conspiracy. The retraction therefore afforded no ground of appeal.

3. The court accepted that the jury had been misled about Kearney’s informant status, possible expectation of assistance with sentence, and motivation to give evidence. The failure to disclose that information resulted from lack of care, rather than a deliberate attempt to keep the prosecution or defence uninformed.

4. However, full disclosure would not have materially changed the jury’s task. The judge had already directed the jury to scrutinise both prison witnesses with the greatest care and to consider whether either had obtained information from a source other than the appellant in the hope of advantage. The chronology showed that Kearney volunteered his information and gave a detailed account before any prospect of registration or sentencing assistance arose. The detail of his account supported the conclusion that its source was the appellant.

5. The court did not substitute its own assessment for that of the jury. It concluded that the circumstantial case was compelling and that disclosure would not have disturbed the jury’s conclusion. The verdicts remained safe.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — On a CCRC reference, the court refused leave on the proposed fresh-evidence ground and dismissed the appeal: [2012] EWCA Crim 5.
• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — The appellant’s earlier appeal against conviction was dismissed on 11 July 1997.
• Maidstone Crown Court — Following a retrial before Wright J, the appellant was convicted of murder and unlawful concealment, disposal or destruction of the body.