Clancy, R. v

The defence of good reason under section 139(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. The phrase has its ordinary meaning and should not be restricted by judicial rules or glosses. The jury must assess all the evidence, including facts concerning the defendant’s state of mind and the reason for it.

Fear of an attack may amount to a good reason, but the defendant’s perception is neither irrelevant nor conclusive. The jury must decide whether the defence is established on the facts as a whole. A judge should withdraw the defence only where a finding of good reason would be perverse.

The appellant was convicted at the Crown Court at Kingston-upon-Thames of two offences of possessing bladed articles in a public place, contrary to section 139(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. She said that, after an alleged sexual assault by a taxi driver, she took two kitchen knives from her home because she feared an attack by him.

Her defence was that she had a good reason for possessing the knives under section 139(4). In answer to a jury question, the Recorder directed that her state of mind could not amount to, or contribute to, a good reason. The appeal challenged that direction. The central issue was whether the jury could take account of the appellant’s state of mind and fear when deciding whether the statutory defence was made out.

Appeal allowed; convictions quashed.

1. The expression good reason in section 139(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 is ordinary language. It does not require judicial gloss. Having found the relevant facts, the jury should ordinarily decide for itself whether they amount to a good reason. The judge should be very slow to rule that particular facts are incapable in law of establishing the defence. That course is justified only where a finding that there was a good reason would be perverse.

2. Fear of an attack can constitute a good reason. The defendant’s state of mind is therefore relevant, although it is not determinative. The tribunal of fact must assess all the evidence, including the facts concerning the defendant’s perception, the basis for it and its reasonableness. The defence is not to be decided solely by reference to the defendant’s subjective view, as it would be in a self-defence inquiry; the governing principles and burden of proof differ.

3. The court explained that R v Manning [1998] Crim. L.R. 198 and R v Jolie [2003] EWCA Crim 1543 establish that good reason requires no judicial explanation. It also accepted the approach in R v McAuley [2009] EWCA Crim 2130 that a fear of attack may support the defence and that the issue should generally be left to the jury.

4. The Recorder’s original direction was unobjectionable. However, his supplementary direction wrongly required the jury to disregard the appellant’s state of mind entirely. A properly directed jury could have reached a different conclusion. The convictions were therefore unsafe and had to be quashed.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — allowed the appeal and quashed the convictions: [2012] EWCA Crim 8.
• Crown Court at Kingston-upon-Thames — convicted the appellant on two counts under section 139(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and imposed a community order.