Welcome Break Group Ltd & Ors, R (on the application of) v Stroud District Council & Anor

[2012] EWHC 140 (Admin)

Case details

Case citations
[2012] EWHC 140 (Admin)
Court
High Court (Administrative Court)
Judgment date
3 February 2012
Judgment text

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Subjects
Administrative Public law Planning judicial review
Keywords
planning permission motorway service area planning officer’s report material considerations planning judgment landscape impact section 106 agreement Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010 judicial review
Outcome
claim dismissed
Judicial consideration

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Summary

In a planning judicial review, the court reviews the legality of the decision-making process, not the planning merits. Whether a matter is material is a question of law; the weight given to it is for the planning authority, subject only to rationality. A planning officer’s report need not address every representation or reproduce every policy. It must fairly identify the principal issues and provide sufficient information and guidance for the committee to apply the statutory criteria. Under regulation 122 of the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010, the court should not itself decide whether a planning obligation was necessary to make development acceptable in planning terms. That is ordinarily a matter of planning judgment. The obligation must, however, be directly related to the development and fairly and reasonably related in scale and kind.

Factual background

The claimants sought judicial review of Stroud District Council’s decision to grant planning permission for a motorway service area at Ongers Farm, near the M5/M50 junction. The claimants included competing motorway service-area operators and local bodies. They alleged failures to address objections concerning need, landscape impact, policy NE8 of the Stroud Local Plan, and Natural England’s representations. They also challenged the reliance on section 106 obligations concerning local food sourcing and employment under regulation 122 of the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010. The central issues were whether the officer’s report materially misled the committee and whether the planning obligations could lawfully be treated as reasons supporting permission.

Held

  1. Outcome. The claim for judicial review was dismissed. None of the four grounds established that the Council’s decision to grant planning permission was unlawful.
  2. Need and officer’s report. The Council was entitled to accept the Highways Agency’s view that the proposal was a core motorway service area under DfT Circular 01/2008, because the relevant gap in provision extended from Ross-on-Wye to Michaelwood. That did not make need a binary question or exclude other material considerations. The committee was entitled to weigh the identified need, including its extent, against landscape harm and other planning considerations.
  3. Reports to planning committees. Applying the approach in Oxton Farms, Mendip, BT and Morge, a report need not be exhaustive or analyse every objection line by line. It must fairly and sufficiently identify the principal issues and key information. The report adequately addressed need, landscape impact, policy NE8 and Natural England’s objections. Any selective quotation from the landscape consultants’ assessment did not materially mislead the committee.
  4. Planning obligations. Under regulation 122 of the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010, the statutory criteria govern whether an obligation may constitute a reason for granting permission. However, the court should not itself determine whether an obligation was necessary to make the development acceptable in planning terms, since that involves planning judgment. Following Tesco, an obligation with more than a de minimis connection to the development must be taken into account; its weight and effect are for the decision-maker. The local food-sourcing and employment obligations were directly related to the development and fairly and reasonably related to it in scale and kind.
  5. The Council’s decision was therefore lawful and the application was dismissed.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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