Oxfordshire County Council v Secretary of State for Communities And Local Government & Ors

Regulation 122 of the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010 imposes a statutory, high-threshold restriction on planning obligations. A contribution must be necessary to make development acceptable in planning terms, directly related to it, and fairly and reasonably related in scale and kind. An inspector may consider the authority’s existing functions, resources and budget. Routine, standardised administration and monitoring fees are not necessarily required merely because a section 106 agreement contains obligations. Exceptional cases may justify such fees. A reasons challenge succeeds only where inadequate reasons cause substantial prejudice.

The claimant sought under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to quash an inspector’s decision concerning a section 106 agreement for a 25-dwelling residential development. The inspector accepted several infrastructure contributions but concluded that waste, adult learning, museums, day care, refuse-bin, monitoring and administration contributions failed regulation 122 of the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010.

The claimant argued that the inspector had misinterpreted the necessity test, acted irrationally, considered an immaterial matter and failed to give adequate reasons. The issues were whether the administration and monitoring fee was necessary to make the development acceptable in planning terms and whether the inspector’s reasons substantially prejudiced the claimant.

1. Claim dismissed. The inspector’s decision disclosed no error of law or irrationality.
2. Section 106(1)(d) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 authorises financial payments to the local planning authority. The claimant was a local planning authority for section 106 purposes and had corresponding enforcement powers under section 106(3), (5), (6) and (9).
3. Regulation 122 is a statutory limitation, rather than policy or guidance. The necessity test in regulation 122(2)(a) imposes a high threshold. Whether a contribution is necessary to make development acceptable in planning terms is principally a matter of planning judgment. The relevant planning purpose concerns the development and use of land.
4. The inspector was entitled to treat administration, monitoring and enforcement of section 106 obligations as part of the claimant’s ordinary functions and resources. The fee was standardised, payable in advance and unrelated to an individual assessment of special costs. The development was routine and relatively small, and the permitted contributions were single payments requiring no continuing management. In those circumstances, the fee was not necessary.
5. An exceptional development might justify a fee, but that would require case-specific assessment and planning judgment.
6. The inspector’s reasons were brief but intelligible. The claimant understood the basis of the decision, was able to challenge it fully and suffered no substantial prejudice under section 288(5)(b). The application was therefore dismissed.

First-instance judicial review under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.