O' Leary International Ltd v North Wales Police

A deprivation order under Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 s 143 deprives the offender only of rights in the property. It does not deprive a non-offending owner of title, possession or the right to bring civil proceedings. The procedure under s 144, incorporating the Police (Property) Act 1897, is an additional summary remedy and is not exclusive. Accordingly, a deprivation order provides no defence to the true owner’s conversion claim, subject possibly to a public policy defence. Alternatively, if s 144 were exclusive, it would require interpretation consistent with Article 1 of Protocol No 1 so that disproportionate deprivation could be avoided.

Four lorries owned by the appellant Irish haulage company were seized after its drivers committed tachograph and related offences. The Magistrates’ Court made deprivation orders under s 143 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. The company was not a party to those proceedings and later applied under s 1(1) of the Police (Property) Act 1897 for delivery of the lorries. The District Judge found that the company knew, or had reason to know, of their criminal use and stated questions concerning statutory interpretation, proportionality and compatibility with Article 1 of Protocol No 1. During the appeal, the company also commenced civil proceedings for conversion. The central issue was whether s 144 provided the owner’s exclusive remedy.

Appeal and civil claim allowed. The court ordered delivery of the lorries to the appellant and answered the stated questions by holding that the Magistrates’ Court should have declined jurisdiction over the company’s claim.

1. Effect of s 143. Section 143(3) expressly operates to deprive the offender of his rights, if any, in the property. It does not affect the ownership rights of a third party who was not an offender. The company had not been heard in the proceedings and could not appeal against the deprivation orders.
2. Non-exclusive remedy. Section 144 supplied the Magistrates’ Court with an additional jurisdiction to deal simply with property held by the police pursuant to a deprivation order. It did not make the statutory procedure exclusive or remove the owner’s right to sue in the civil courts. The language and structure of the legislation, including s 1(2) of the 1897 Act, supported that conclusion.
3. Conversion. The appellant retained the full rights of the true owner, including possession. The deprivation orders therefore provided no defence to the police against its claim, unless a public policy defence were available. No such defence was advanced.
4. Alternative proportionality conclusion. If s 144 had been exclusive, it would have required interpretation to permit consideration of the property’s value, the owner’s culpability and the financial effect of deprivation. Otherwise the owner’s rights under Article 1 of Protocol No 1 would have been violated. On that alternative basis, the issue would have been remitted for determination by the District Judge.

• Magistrates’ Court: made deprivation orders under s 143 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 and rejected the company’s application for return of the lorries.
• Crown Court: upheld the sentence and deprivation order in respect of the fourth offence, without allowing the company to make representations.
• High Court (Administrative Court): ordered delivery of the lorries and held that the company retained its civil remedies.