Hall, R v

A deprivation order under section 143 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 is not a forfeiture order. It deprives an offender only of the offender’s own rights in property. It cannot affect the undisputed rights of a true third-party owner.

Actual police seizure is not essential where the property was in the offender’s possession or control when apprehended. However, a sentencing court must identify a proper statutory basis for the order. An order based on the mistaken view that a vehicle can be confiscated and sold despite innocent third-party ownership should be quashed.

The appellant was convicted in the Crown Court at Reading of dangerous driving. He also pleaded guilty to driving whilst disqualified and was sentenced for driving with excess alcohol. The sentencing judge imposed concurrent custodial sentences totalling 15 months and made a ten-year driving disqualification.

The judge also made a deprivation order over a Mercedes driven during the offences, intending that it be forfeited and sold. The appellant’s father owned the vehicle when the offences occurred and had not knowingly permitted the appellant, who was disqualified, to drive it. The appellant appealed solely against the deprivation order.

The central issue was whether the order could properly be made under section 143 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 and whether it could affect the rights of the vehicle’s true owner.

Appeal allowed. The court quashed the deprivation order.

1. Section 143 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 does not require police seizure of the property at the time of apprehension. The power may arise where property was in the offender’s possession or control when apprehended and was used to commit or facilitate an offence.

2. However, an order under section 143 is not equivalent to forfeiture. Under section 143(3), it deprives only the offender of any rights held in the property. It does not affect the rights of a true owner where title is undisputed. This construction was consistent with the analysis in O'Leary International Limited v Chief Constable of North Wales Police [2012] EWHC 1516 (Admin).

3. There was no evidence that the father, who owned the vehicle when the offences occurred, had participated in or knowingly permitted the offending. The sentencing judge had treated the order as a means of confiscating and selling the vehicle, including to defray public expense. That was not its legal effect. On the facts known, or available had the matter been investigated, there was no basis for the order.

4. The court expressly left open whether section 143 may, in another case, deprive an offender of possession of a vehicle despite the offender having no title to it.

The appellant’s application for costs from central funds was refused because an earlier application under the slip rule could have avoided the appeal hearing.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — allowed the appeal and quashed the deprivation order: [2014] EWCA Crim 2413.
• Crown Court at Reading — convicted the appellant of dangerous driving and sentenced him for that offence, driving whilst disqualified and driving with excess alcohol; made the deprivation order over the Mercedes.