Tilbrook v Parr

For defamation and malicious falsehood, words must be reasonably capable of being understood as referring to the claimant. An allegation attacking a group does not, without more, identify every individual member. The claimant’s prominence or office within the group is insufficient by itself. At an interlocutory stage, the question is capability, not the meaning ultimately proved. The court should avoid strained interpretations and bear in mind the importance of uninhibited public criticism of political parties and other public bodies. If the words are incapable of referring to the claimant, both claims fail where individual reference is essential.

The claimant, chairman of the English Democrats, sued the defendant over an internet blog publication. The publication named two other individuals said to have joined the English Democrats and ended with an allegation that the party was racist. The claimant was not named, and the pleaded facts identified no particular publishees or other circumstances capable of linking the words to him individually.

The defendant applied to strike out the claim or obtain summary judgment. The central issue was whether the words were reasonably capable of referring to the claimant. The same issue arose in relation to the claims for defamation and malicious falsehood.

1. Application granted. The words complained of were not capable of referring to the claimant. That conclusion disposed of both the defamation and malicious falsehood claims.

2. The governing question was whether the words were reasonably capable of being understood as referring to the claimant, rather than whether they would in fact be so understood. The court applied the reasonableness principles stated in Jeynes v News Magazines Limited [2008] EWCA Civ 130.

3. The case was indistinguishable from Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Limited [1944] AC 116. An attack on a group does not identify every individual member, and the claimant’s position as chairman did not make him individually identifiable.

4. The court also took account of the protection of freedom of expression and the risk that discussion of public affairs would be inhibited if individuals were too readily treated as identified by criticism of a group or political party.

5. Any proposed amendment relying on other internet publications would raise further issues. There is no presumption that a reader of one blog article has read all others, as noted in Amoudi v Brisard [2006] EWHC 1062 (QB); [2007] 1 WLR 113.