Proudfoot Properties v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor

In a planning reasons challenge, the court must decide whether the applicant has suffered substantial prejudice from the deficiency, rather than apply an abstract standard of adequacy. Reasons must enable an informed reader to understand how the principal controversial issues of law and fact were resolved. Where personal circumstances and human-rights arguments depend on a central disputed fact, the inspector must either reach a conclusion on that fact or make clear that it has been assumed in the applicant’s favour when assessing its weight. Failure to identify the factual basis of the decision may create substantial prejudice, particularly where it affects future planning applications and the assessment of proportionality under A1P1.

The claimant challenged, under section 288(5)(b) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, an inspector’s dismissal of its appeal against refusal of permission for six houses and garages on a former pig-rearing site in the High Weald Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty.

The claimant relied on inadequate reasons. It argued that the inspector had failed to explain whether the pig-rearing use had ceased on the understanding that the council would permit alternative development, and had consequently failed adequately to assess personal circumstances and the proportionality of the refusal under A1P1. The central issue was whether the decision letter sufficiently disclosed the factual basis for rejecting those grounds.

1. The claim succeeded and the inspector’s decision was quashed. The court does not substitute its own planning judgment for that of the decision-maker. The exercise of planning judgment and the weighing of competing considerations remain matters for the planning authority or inspector.
2. The duty to give reasons under rule 16 of the Town and Country Planning (Hearings Procedure) Rules 2000 requires an intelligible explanation of the principal controversial issues. A decision letter must be read fairly, as a whole, in a straightforward manner and by a well-informed reader. The reasons need not address every material consideration.
3. The governing question under section 288(5)(b) is whether the applicant’s interests have been substantially prejudiced by the deficiency in reasons. The question is not whether the reasons satisfy an abstract standard, nor whether the claimant would probably succeed on the planning merits. Substantial prejudice may arise where the reasons leave unresolved a material issue of law or fact, or prevent the applicant from understanding the prospects of alternative development.
4. Personal circumstances and personal hardship may be material considerations capable of receiving direct effect in an exceptional or special case, applying Westminster City Council v Great Portland Estates plc [1985] AC 661. The claimant’s reliance on an alleged understanding with the council was therefore capable of affecting both the weight given to its personal circumstances and the proportionality assessment under A1P1.
5. The inspector merely recorded the dispute about why the pig-rearing use had ceased. He did not state whether he accepted or rejected the claimant’s account, or that he had assumed it in the claimant’s favour. Since the same disputed facts informed both the personal-circumstances and human-rights grounds, the omission created uncertainty about the factual basis of the proportionality assessment. That uncertainty substantially prejudiced the claimant, including in relation to repeated or future planning applications.

This was a first-instance judicial review claim in the Administrative Court. The challenged decision was an inspector’s decision dated 1 June 2011 dismissing the claimant’s planning appeal. The court quashed that decision.