Strazewski, R (on the application of) v Circut Court in Wroclaw, Poland & Anor

For an accusation European Arrest Warrant, section 2(4)(c) of the Extradition Act 2003 requires sufficient particularity to enable the requested person to understand the allegation and assess the statutory bars. The warrant need not resemble pleadings or an indictment. An allegation of active participation in a physical robbery may satisfy the requirement without specifying every participant’s precise role.

Oppression based on delay requires an evaluative assessment of the chronology, the requested person’s knowledge, prejudice, personal circumstances and the public interest in extradition. Culpable delay must reach a very high level before it can justify refusal. Generalised assertions of forensic prejudice are insufficient, particularly where the person knew for years of the requesting state’s interest.

The claimant faced extradition to Poland under two European Arrest Warrants concerning serious robbery, burglary and attempted burglary allegations. Extradition under the first warrant was ordered by District Judge Tubbs on 1 August 2011. The second warrant was considered by Senior District Judge Riddle, who ordered extradition on 27 February 2012.

The conjoined appeals raised whether the first warrant sufficiently particularised the claimant’s alleged participation, whether the senior district judge wrongly refused an adjournment to call the claimant’s daughter, and whether the passage of time, delay, personal circumstances and alleged prejudice made extradition oppressive or unjust.

The conjoined appeals were dismissed.

1. Particularity of EAW1. Section 2(4)(c) of the Extradition Act 2003 requires a significant level of particularisation, but a European Arrest Warrant is not to be treated as pleadings or as particulars of an indictment. The warrant alleged participation in a specific physical robbery, kidnapping and deprivation of liberty. In that context, the allegation conveyed active physical participation and just satisfied the statutory requirement. The challenge to EAW1 therefore failed.
2. Adjournment. The senior district judge was entitled to refuse an adjournment sought to call the claimant’s daughter. The evidence became clearly material shortly after further information arrived from Poland on 24 January 2012, yet the conference was not held until 7 February and no statement or adequate account of the proposed evidence was prepared. Even if the chronology had been understood differently, the decision would have been the same because the conclusion that the claimant knew of the Polish authorities’ interest rested principally on the nephew’s evidence.
3. Oppression and injustice. The court considered the delay, the claimant’s mental-health treatment and therapeutic relationships, debts, family and private life, travel to Poland, alleged false sense of security and asserted forensic prejudice. These matters did not outweigh the public interest in extradition for very serious offences. The claimant had known of active Polish interest since at least 2007, the delay after March 2008 was insufficiently serious, and the alleged prejudice was generalised. Culpable state delay must reach a very high level before it can justify refusing extradition.

Extradition was permitted under both warrants. The court also criticised the late provision of material relevant to the hearing and ordered the usual assessment of legally aided costs.

• High Court (Administrative Court): the conjoined appeals against the extradition decisions were dismissed.
• Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Tubbs ordered extradition under EAW1 on 1 August 2011. Senior District Judge Riddle ordered extradition under EAW2 on 27 February 2012.