Von Der Pahlen v Government of Austria

A Part 1 European arrest warrant must give particulars of the circumstances in which the requested person allegedly committed the offence. Under section 2(4)(c) of the Extradition Act 2003, those particulars must identify the alleged conduct, its time and place, and the applicable foreign law.

A broad description of an offence is insufficient. Although the required degree of detail depends on the case, a warrant fails where vagueness or obscurity prevents the alleged conduct from being understood. The need for efficient extradition does not displace strict compliance with statutory safeguards protecting the requested person’s liberty.

An Austrian court issued a European arrest warrant seeking the appellant’s extradition for three alleged dishonesty offences arising from his involvement in house-building companies. The warrant alleged fraud, dishonest dealings and faked bankruptcy, involving losses exceeding €50,000.

The Bow Street District Judge rejected an argument that extradition would be oppressive because of the passage of time and ordered extradition. On appeal, the appellant contended that the warrant lacked the particulars required by section 2(4)(c) of the Extradition Act 2003. He also relied on injustice and oppression resulting from the passage of time.

The central issue was whether the descriptions of the three alleged offences identified the appellant’s conduct with sufficient particularity.

1. The appeal was allowed. The extradition order was quashed and the appellant’s discharge was ordered under section 27(5) of the Extradition Act 2003. The passage-of-time ground did not require determination.

2. Section 2(4)(c) should receive its plain and ordinary meaning. A Part 1 warrant must give particulars comprising four elements: the conduct alleged to constitute the offence; the time of that conduct; its place; and the foreign-law provision under which it constitutes an offence. The word “particulars” means that an omnibus description of an offence, such as obtaining property by deception, will not suffice.

3. The precise degree of detail required cannot be prescribed for every case. Nevertheless, all three charges were too vague, and the second and third were also too obscure. The first charge did not identify the victims, the number or size of the advance payments beyond their aggregate value, or the alleged misrepresentations. The second did not identify the relevant property or sums and presented unexplained alternative allegations. The third failed adequately to particularise the customers, suppliers, works or invoices concerned.

4. The court declined to make sense of the third charge by deleting substantial language as redundant. That approach was inconsistent with the relatively strict compliance required where the requested person’s liberty was at stake. The principle of speciality in article 27.2 of the Framework Decision reinforced the need for adequate particularity.

5. Palar and Vey were examples of the application of section 2(4)(c), rather than authorities interpreting it. The requirement of strict statutory compliance stated in Office of the King’s Prosecutor, Brussels v Cando Armas [2005] UKHL 67 was applied. Walker J agreed with Dyson LJ.

1. High Court, Divisional Court: The appeal was allowed. The extradition order was quashed and the appellant’s discharge was ordered.

2. High Court: Andrew Collins J granted permission to appeal.

3. Bow Street Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Anthony Evans rejected the passage-of-time objection and ordered the appellant’s extradition to Austria.