Tumova v County Court In Melnik, Czech Republic

For the purposes of an extradition warrant, particulars are adequate where, read with reasonable common sense, they enable the requested person and the court to understand the substance of the allegation. A continuing offence may be described over a period, although the level of particularisation depends on the circumstances. The actus reus and mens rea of a corresponding domestic offence may be inferred where they are an inevitable consequence of, or necessarily implied by, the conduct particularised. An appellate court should intervene in the lower court’s Article 8 balance only for an error of principle or a clearly incorrect conclusion. The public interest in extradition will ordinarily be difficult to outweigh where a fugitive has spent a short period in the United Kingdom and has substantial family connections in the requesting state.

The appellant appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against a District Judge’s order for extradition to the Czech Republic. Two conviction warrants were before the District Judge. The appeal concerned only EAW1, relating to an offence under Article 201 of the Czech criminal code, and challenged the warrant’s compliance with section 2(6)(b), the adequacy of its particulars, and the Article 8 balance.

The appellant argued that EAW1 might concern more than one offence, failed adequately to describe the conduct, and did not particularise the actus reus or mens rea. She also challenged the District Judge’s assessment of her private and family life. The central issues were whether the warrant sufficiently identified the alleged offending and whether the extradition decision involved an appealable error.

1. The appeal was dismissed. EAW1 stated that it related to one offence. The reference to a cumulative prison sentence described the amalgamated nature of the sentence, not multiple offences. No reasonable inference arose that a second offence was concealed.
2. Section 2(6)(b) required adequate particulars of the conduct alleged to constitute the offence. The appropriate level of particularisation depended on the circumstances. The allegation that the appellant frequently left her young daughter alone and unsupervised while receiving visitors during evening and night hours sufficiently conveyed the substance of the allegation, notwithstanding the period covered and the imprecision of the word frequently.
3. The actus reus of the likely corresponding domestic offence under section 1(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 could be inferred to the criminal standard. Frequent neglect over several years, together with likely disturbance of the child’s sleep, made it inevitable or at least highly likely that the child’s emotional and psychological development was hampered or jeopardised.
4. The mens rea required for the domestic offence could also be inferred. The appellant was said to have knowingly received visitors at times when the child was left alone and unsupervised. On the facts particularised, the requisite state of mind was an inevitable corollary of, or necessarily implied by, the conduct.
5. The Article 8 challenge failed. The balance was for the District Judge, and appellate intervention required an error of principle or a clearly incorrect conclusion. The appellant had been in the United Kingdom for less than two years, was a fugitive, and had substantial family connections in the Czech Republic. Even if EAW1 had been removed, the public interest in extradition would probably have prevailed.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal against the District Judge’s extradition order was dismissed. The judgment under appeal was given by District Judge Bouch on 11 December 2018.