Badre v Court of Florence, Italy

For dual criminality under the Extradition Act 2003, the court must identify the essence of the conduct alleged in the European Arrest Warrant. It must then determine, to the criminal standard, whether that conduct would constitute an offence in England and Wales.

A strong presumption that a Convention state will observe article 3 may be rebutted by a European Court of Human Rights pilot judgment identifying a continuing systemic prison problem. The requesting state must then dispel the resulting doubts with sufficient evidence. A general assurance of Convention compliance will rarely suffice where it does not identify the likely place or conditions of detention.

The appellant challenged an order of Westminster Magistrates’ Court for his extradition to Italy under a European Arrest Warrant. He was accused of conducting an unauthorised payment-services business through the hawala system.

The appeal concerned the validity of an electronically authenticated certificate, the adequacy of the warrant’s particulars, dual criminality, and the risk of detention in conditions contrary to article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The central questions were whether the conduct alleged would constitute an offence in England and Wales and whether Italy had sufficiently answered evidence of a systemic problem in its prisons.

1. Appeal allowed. The extradition order was set aside because the dual-criminality requirement was not established and the evidence disclosed a real risk of treatment contrary to article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

2. The certificate under section 2 of the Extradition Act 2003 was valid. Certification requires the relevant official to address the statutory requirements, but an electronic signature does not invalidate a certificate. The initials and identifying code, together with confirmation of the official’s identity, showed that SOCA had issued and authenticated it through a human official.

3. The warrant’s particulars raised legitimate concerns, but the court did not decide the appeal on that ground. The information must enable the requested person to understand the nature and extent of the allegations, invoke any restrictions on extradition and ensure observance of speciality. The required detail depends upon the offence and is not equivalent to particulars on an indictment.

4. For section 64(3)(b), the foreign and domestic offences need not correspond in every respect. The court must identify the essence of the conduct alleged. Here that essence was conducting payment-services business without completing the rigorous authorisation process required in Italy. Failure to register under separate United Kingdom money-laundering legislation was not charged and was legally irrelevant. Because a small payment institution could lawfully operate in the United Kingdom by registration rather than full authorisation, the alleged conduct would not necessarily constitute an offence in England and Wales. Dual criminality was therefore not proved to the criminal standard.

5. A requested person must show substantial grounds for believing that extradition would expose him to a real risk of article 3 ill-treatment. Convention compliance by the requesting state is strongly presumed, but the presumption is rebuttable. The pilot judgment in Torreggiani, together with evidence that Italy’s systemic prison-overcrowding problem continued, rebutted it. The burden then lay on the requesting authority to dispel the resulting doubts.

6. Italy’s assurance was too general. It did not identify the prison or likely conditions of detention and did not exclude either prison examined in Torreggiani. In the face of a pilot judgment identifying systemic failure, a bare assurance of article 3 compliance will rarely suffice. A sufficiently specific assurance might identify the prison, describe its conditions and explain why the systemic criticism does not apply there.

7. The request for an adjournment to obtain improved assurances was refused. The issue had been known for a substantial period, and there was no good reason to permit the requesting authority to supplement its evidence at that late stage.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): Allowed the appeal against the extradition order on dual-criminality and article 3 grounds.

2. Westminster Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Zani ordered the appellant’s extradition to Italy on 19 December 2013 under section 21(3) of the Extradition Act 2003. District Judge Bayne had earlier accepted the designated authority’s certificate at the initial hearing.