GS & Ors v Central District of Pest Hungary & Ors

Where reliable evidence establishes a real risk that extradition would expose a requested person to prison conditions contrary to article 3, an assurance from the requesting state may dispel that risk. Its sufficiency requires a fact-sensitive assessment of its quality and practical reliability. The factors identified in Othman are neither a checklist nor a hierarchy.

A specific assurance by a responsible official of a Convention or EU state is presumed to be honoured unless cogent evidence shows otherwise. It need not identify a particular prison or provide direct monitoring by the sending state. Under article 8, ordinary hardship to a requested person’s partner and young child will generally carry insufficient weight to overcome the strong public interest in extradition.

Four requested persons appealed against orders for their extradition to Hungary. They contended that systemic overcrowding in Hungarian prisons created a real risk of degrading treatment contrary to article 3 of the Convention, so that extradition was prohibited by section 21 of the Extradition Act 2003. The parties accepted that Varga v Hungary rebutted the ordinary presumption that Hungary would comply with its Convention obligations.

Hungary provided a diplomatic assurance guaranteeing each appellant at least three square metres of personal cell space. The common issue was whether that assurance sufficiently dispelled the established risk. Zsolt Árpási also argued that extradition would disproportionately interfere with his family life under article 8. GS had a separate article 8 ground which was adjourned following significant developments in her domestic circumstances.

1. Article 3 appeals dismissed. The Hungarian assurance sufficiently dispelled the doubts arising from Varga v Hungary. There were no substantial grounds for believing that the appellants faced a real risk of treatment contrary to article 3 if extradited.
2. Varga was focused on prolonged overcrowding and restricted personal space, aggravated in individual cases by other adverse conditions. It did not establish that everyone entering the Hungarian prison system faced an article 3 risk from subsidiary conditions where at least three square metres of personal space was available. Strasbourg had deliberately avoided an inflexible minimum-space rule because the duration and overall conditions of detention remained relevant.
3. Following Othman (Abu Qatada) v United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 1, the court had to assess the assurance’s quality and whether it could be relied upon in practice. The identified factors were neither a checklist nor a hierarchy. Their weight depended upon the circumstances. It was therefore wrong to convert observations in Badre v Court of Florence, Italy [2014] EWHC 614 (Admin) about identifying a prison into a general legal requirement.
4. The assurance was specific, unambiguous and given by the Hungarian Ministry of Justice on behalf of the national prison service. It guaranteed the required space wherever each person was detained. Under Ilia v Appeal Court in Athens (Greece) [2015] EWHC 547 (Admin), an assurance by a responsible official of a Council of Europe or EU state was presumed to be honoured unless cogent evidence showed otherwise. No such evidence was produced.
5. The assurance would be recorded in each prisoner’s file. The prisoners could complain through their Hungarian lawyers, former English lawyers, the prison authorities, the Ministry or the Ombudsman. Hungary confirmed compliance for those already surrendered. Direct monitoring by the United Kingdom and an individually enforceable domestic remedy were unnecessary in these circumstances.
6. Árpási’s article 8 appeal dismissed. The interests of his young son were a primary consideration. Nevertheless, the anticipated financial hardship, disruption of care and difficulty maintaining contact were commonplace consequences of extraditing a parent. They were far from the exceptionally severe consequences capable of outweighing the public interest in extradition.
7. Osztrovszky’s, Rafael’s and Árpási’s appeals were dismissed. GS’s article 3 ground failed, but her article 8 ground remained adjourned for further consideration.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The common article 3 grounds were dismissed. Árpási’s article 8 ground was also dismissed. GS’s article 8 ground was adjourned.
• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: District Judges ordered each appellant’s extradition to Hungary. The orders were made on 26 January 2015 for GS, 23 February 2015 for Osztrovszky, 14 August 2015 for Rafael and 10 October 2014 for Árpási.