Ioskevich v Government of the Russian Federation

On an extradition appeal, the appellate court must decide whether the district judge made the wrong decision, but the appeal is not a rehearing. Substantial weight is due to findings based on live evidence. Mutual trust creates a rebuttable presumption that a Convention state will comply with the ECHR. Specific, personalised and objectively verifiable assurances may rebut an Article 3 risk, even where systemic problems exist. A systemic concern about judicial corruption does not establish an Article 6 risk without case-specific evidence of an unfair trial. The appeal was dismissed.

The Russian Federation sought the appellant’s extradition to enforce an 18-month sentence for fraud. The district judge accepted assurances identifying the pre-trial detention facility and post-conviction penal colony, and concluded that extradition would not breach Articles 3 or 6 ECHR.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the assessment of prison conditions, the reliability of the assurances, the fairness of a retrial, and proposed transit arrangements. The central questions were whether the district judge had made an appealable error and whether the evidence established a real risk of Convention violations.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appellate question under section 27 of the Extradition Act 2003 was whether the district judge ought to have decided a question differently. The appeal was not a rehearing. The district judge was entitled to substantial leeway on primary findings based on live evidence. Greater scrutiny could apply to inferences from established facts or the construction of documents.
2. The district judge carefully assessed the risk that prison evidence had been staged or manipulated. His preference for the first-hand evidence of Professor Morgan over Professor Bowring’s general criticisms was rationally open to him. The findings on the specified facilities were upheld.
3. Article 3 prevented extradition where the requested person faced a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment. Mutual trust between Convention states created a rebuttable presumption of compliance. The pilot judgment in Ananyev v Russia concerned pre-trial detention and systemic overcrowding; it did not establish that every other feature of the Russian system breached Article 3. The assurances were specific, personalised, sufficiently authoritative, and independently verifiable. They were sufficient to address the risk.
4. The Article 6 challenge relied on systemic corruption and unsupported inferences about the complainant’s influence. The district judge was entitled to find no real risk of a rigged or unfair trial.
5. The transit ground was addressed despite the absence of permission. The proposed arrangements were materially different from those relied upon in Dzgoev v Russian Federation. Article 3 assessment of cell space was contextual. The appeal disclosed no basis for rejecting the Russian assurances or finding a violation.

• High Court (Administrative Court): District Judge McPhee’s decision of 1 August 2016 sent the extradition request to the Secretary of State. The present court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conclusions on Articles 3 and 6 ECHR.