Rashid v General Medical Council

An appeal under section 41A(10) of the Medical Act 1983 is a full appeal. The High Court exercises its own judgment and may consider subsequent developments and fresh evidence.

Interim suspension on public-interest grounds requires a high level of justification. The court must assess the seriousness of the alleged conduct and the cogency of the evidence, treating proportionality as part of deciding whether suspension is necessary or desirable. General disputes, weakly supported allegations and matters unrelated to clinical practice will not ordinarily justify suspension merely to maintain public confidence.

Dr Rashid appealed against an 18-month interim suspension imposed by the General Medical Council’s Interim Orders Panel on 24 April 2012. The panel relied on allegations concerning disputes with a former partner and a primary care trust, disclosure of information, the handling of medicines and patient records, and Dr Rashid’s arrest during a police investigation into alleged insurance fraud.

There were no clinical concerns about his practice, no performer’s-list investigation, and no criminal charge or specific allegation had been put to him. The central issue was whether the allegations, individually or cumulatively, justified interim suspension in the public interest under section 41A of the Medical Act 1983.

Appeal allowed. The court terminated the interim suspension.

1. The jurisdiction under section 41A(10) of the Medical Act 1983 is a full appeal, not a judicial-review jurisdiction. The court decides what order is appropriate and may consider subsequent developments and fresh evidence. Nevertheless, where an interim suspension is extant, the court begins from the position that the panel considered suspension appropriate.
2. The statutory grounds remained those stated by Parliament. Proportionality formed part of the overall assessment of whether suspension was necessary or, at least, desirable. The threshold for interim suspension on public-interest grounds was high because suspension seriously affects professional reputation and the ability to earn a living.
3. The assessment required attention both to the nature of the alleged offence and to the cogency of the evidence. Although the panel was not conducting a fact-finding exercise, the strength of the evidence affected the assessment of risk and the possibility of injustice. The panel should also consider whether it would be acceptable not to suspend if the allegations were ultimately proved, and whether it would be acceptable to suspend if the doctor were ultimately acquitted.
4. The panel’s reasons were largely formulaic and did not explain why the particular allegations created serious public concerns or why no lesser measure would suffice. The disputes, the surgery arrangements and the disclosure matters did not justify suspension. The medicines and records allegations had explanations and, without fact-finding, did not come close to justifying immediate suspension.
5. The police material was sparse. No charge or specific allegation had been made, and the police had not identified Dr Rashid as the doctor referred to in the inquiry. The allegation could not therefore be assessed as sufficiently serious or sufficiently cogent, either alone or cumulatively with the other matters. Suspension was neither necessary, desirable nor proportionate.

• High Court (Administrative Court): the appeal against the Interim Orders Panel’s interim suspension order was allowed, and the suspension was terminated. The defendant was ordered to pay the claimant’s costs on the standard basis, with a payment on account of £20,000.