Sosanya, R (on the application of) v General Medical Council

An interim suspension order under section 41A of the Medical Act 1983 requires a properly reasoned finding that suspension is necessary for public protection, the public interest, or the practitioner’s interests. A panel must apply the statutory test rather than merely repeat guidance or statutory language. It must identify the specific risk relied on and explain why suspension is necessary and proportionate. Serious criminal allegations unrelated to clinical practice do not, without more, establish a real risk to patients or a substantial public-interest need for interim suspension. The court should show appropriate deference to the specialist panel, but deference does not replace rational and cogent reasoning.

Dr Julianna Sosanya challenged an Interim Orders Panel decision of the General Medical Council made on 10 August 2009. The panel had imposed an 18-month interim suspension while she faced trial on money-laundering charges, which she denied. The proceedings began as a judicial review claim and were amended to include an application under section 41A(10) of the Medical Act 1983 for termination of the suspension.

The central issues were whether the panel had properly applied the statutory test, identified a sufficient public or personal interest, and provided adequate reasons for concluding that suspension was necessary and proportionate.

1. The suspension was terminated. The court considered that it could intervene either because the panel’s decision could not stand or, preferably, by exercising its jurisdiction under section 41A(10) of the Medical Act 1983.
2. The statutory test had to be applied. The panel needed to be satisfied that suspension was necessary for the protection of members of the public, otherwise in the public interest, or in the interests of the fully registered person. Its reference to possible impairment of fitness to practise and to all three statutory limbs appeared largely to repeat guidance rather than analyse the statutory criteria.
3. The panel had identified no evidence that the money-laundering allegations affected Dr Sosanya’s clinical abilities or created a real risk to patients. Nor was there a proper basis for concluding that suspension was in her own interests, particularly since she resisted suspension and it affected her employment, family and reputation.
4. Public interest could in principle justify interim suspension in a non-clinical case. However, the panel had to explain why suspension was necessary before the criminal allegations were resolved, including by considering the consequences of not suspending if the allegations were proved and of suspending if the practitioner were acquitted. The charges were serious but not of the gravest kind, and no specific risk or substantial public-interest justification was identified.
5. The panel’s proportionality conclusion was unsupported by substantive reasons. Appropriate respect was owed to the panel’s specialist judgment, but deference could not become obsequiousness. The suspension was therefore neither necessary nor proportionate. The claimant succeeded, and costs were summarily assessed at £8,000, excluding costs before the panel.

The proceedings challenged an Interim Orders Panel decision of the General Medical Council dated 10 August 2009, which imposed an 18-month interim suspension. The High Court (Administrative Court) terminated the suspension under section 41A(10) of the Medical Act 1983.