Bradshaw v General Medical Council

The court’s jurisdiction under section 41A(10) of the Medical Act 1983 is not confined to judicial review. The court must exercise its own judgment, while starting from the existence of the Interim Orders Panel’s extant suspension. Public-interest suspension does not require statutory necessity in the same terms as public-protection suspension, but it must at least be desirable and proportionate. The court must weigh the public interest in suspension against the doctor’s interests and attach appropriate, rather than automatic, weight to the Panel’s opinion. Interim suspension for non-clinical allegations remains relatively rare, but serious allegations of dishonesty, fabrication of evidence and obstruction of investigations may justify suspension where they raise substantial concerns about probity, integrity and public confidence in the doctor-patient relationship.

Dr Steven Bradshaw applied under section 41A(10) of the Medical Act 1983 to terminate an 18-month interim suspension imposed by the General Medical Council’s Interim Orders Panel. The suspension followed investigations by his former employer into allegations that he had made false accusations, lied during an investigation, fabricated or altered documents and acted dishonestly.

He relied on his unblemished clinical record, positive testimonials, the effect on his specialist training and the absence of allegations concerning clinical competence. The GMC relied on the seriousness of the alleged dishonesty and its implications for public confidence. The central issues were the scope of the court’s jurisdiction, the applicable public-interest test, the weight to be given to the Panel’s opinion and whether suspension was proportionate.

1. Jurisdiction. The application under section 41A(10) of the Medical Act 1983 was not limited to judicial review. The court had to decide for itself what order was appropriate, while recognising that an extant Interim Orders Panel suspension would be terminated only if the court considered it wrong. The court could consider subsequent developments and fresh evidence. [2010] EWHC 1296 (Admin) at [20]–[22].
2. Public-interest standard. Section 41A(1) expressly required necessity for suspension on public-protection grounds, but imposed no identical qualification on the public-interest limb. Nevertheless, suspension had to be at least desirable in the public interest, and proportionality required careful balancing of the harm to the public interest if the doctor continued practising against the damage caused to the doctor by suspension. The court should not add statutory tests that Parliament had not enacted. [2010] EWHC 1296 (Admin) at [21]–[22].
3. Weight given to the Panel. The court was not bound by the Panel’s opinion. It had to attach such weight as was appropriate after a holistic assessment of the opinion’s content, reasoning, expertise and circumstances. Deference could not become obsequiousness. The court therefore gave the Panel’s view appropriate weight but exercised its own judgment. [2010] EWHC 1296 (Admin) at [28]–[30], [33].
4. Application. The absence of criticism of clinical competence, the claimant’s testimonials, his denial of the allegations, the effect on his training and the financial and reputational consequences of suspension were all relevant. The Panel had, however, considered the principal factors and identified allegations extending beyond a private dispute. Alleged fabrication and alteration of documents, false accusations and repeated lies to an investigator raised serious issues of honesty, probity and integrity. They could undermine public confidence and were materially closer to the doctor-patient relationship than allegations such as money-laundering or false travel claims where no risk to patients or public confidence had been identified.
5. The Panel should not have relied on the typing error in the claimant’s curriculum vitae or the alleged absence of evidence that his postgraduate dean knew of the allegations, since those matters had not been formally alleged. Leaving those matters aside, the remaining allegations and the careful underlying investigations justified the suspension. The application to terminate the suspension was dismissed. [2010] EWHC 1296 (Admin) at [23]–[33].