Patel v General Medical Council

On an application under section 41A(10) of the Medical Act 1983, the court exercises an original jurisdiction and must reach its own conclusion. It should give the specialist panel’s decision such weight as the circumstances warrant, but must examine its reasoning with appropriate rigour.

An interim suspension imposed solely in the public interest requires careful consideration of necessity and proportionality. The relevant question is whether a reasonable and properly informed member of the public would regard continued practice, pending resolution of allegations, as undermining confidence in the profession. The nature of the alleged wrongdoing, the absence of clinical concerns, the presumption of innocence and the risk to patients must be evaluated together. The court terminated the suspension.

The claimant, a general practitioner, faced a criminal charge of conspiracy to defraud arising from alleged unauthorised payments made while he was a school governor. An Interim Orders Panel suspended his registration for 18 months under section 41A of the Medical Act 1983, relying on the public-interest ground and finding no suitable conditions.

He applied under section 41A(10) to terminate the order. The central issues were the extent of the court’s jurisdiction, the weight to be given to the Panel’s determination, and whether continued practice would be necessary and proportionate to maintain public confidence while the criminal allegations remained unresolved.

1. Jurisdiction and approach. The application engaged an original statutory jurisdiction under section 41A(10) of the Medical Act 1983, rather than judicial review. The court had to reach its own conclusion, while giving the Panel’s decision such weight as the circumstances warranted in light of its expertise and familiarity with professional standards. That respect was important but not determinative.
2. Applicable assessment. The court applied the approach reflected in paragraph 33 of the Guidance for Interim Orders Panels. It asked what a reasonable and properly informed member of the public would think if the claimant were ultimately convicted but had been allowed to continue practising meanwhile, and whether public confidence in the profession would thereby be undermined. The observer had to be attributed knowledge of the relevant facts, rather than allowed to proceed on superficial analysis or prejudice.
3. Application. The allegations concerned serious sums and an extended period, but the nature of the alleged wrongdoing was critical. There was no evidence of any threat to patient welfare, no previous complaint about the claimant’s clinical competence or honesty, no allegation of personal financial gain, and the claimant remained presumed innocent. The legal and factual characterisation of the payments remained matters for the criminal proceedings.
4. The possible failure to notify the Primary Care Trust under Regulation 9 of the NHS (Performers Lists) Regulations 2004 was not finally determined and, in any event, would not by itself justify continued suspension.
5. The balancing exercise came clearly against suspension. A properly informed member of the public would not be offended or surprised by continued practice in the circumstances, and public confidence would not be undermined. The interim suspension was therefore terminated under section 41A(10).

The judgment describes an Interim Orders Panel decision dated 4 July 2012 imposing an 18-month interim suspension under section 41A of the Medical Act 1983. The Administrative Court exercised its original statutory jurisdiction under section 41A(10) and terminated the suspension.