Gulamhusein v General Medical Council

An interim suspension order for a regulated professional is a remedy of last resort. Under Pharmacy Order 2010, suspension is justified only where it is necessary for public protection or otherwise in the public interest. The disciplinary body must first consider whether workable conditions would provide an appropriate and proportionate safeguard.

Unproven allegations may be considered, but they require careful scrutiny and assessment of their cogency. On an appeal exercising original jurisdiction, the court gives appropriate weight to the specialist body’s decision without treating the challenge as ordinary judicial review. Suspension may be proportionate where the allegations disclose an apparently deliberate and serious breach of professional duties which conditions could not adequately address.

The appellant, a registered pharmacist, challenged the Fitness to Practise Committee’s decision to continue his interim suspension. The allegations concerned the supply of prescription-only medicines without prescriptions, including medicines said to be intended for an unlawful abortion.

The Committee considered suspension necessary for public protection and the public interest under article 56(1) of the Pharmacy Order 2010. It rejected conditions permitting supervised practice. The appellant argued that the allegations were unproven, that conditions would suffice, and that suspension was disproportionate. The court also considered the Council’s application to extend the suspension under article 56(5).

1. Outcome. The appeal was dismissed. The suspension was continued for a further six months, from 15 July 2014 to 14 January 2015. Costs were ordered to be assessed if not agreed.
2. Article 56(1) of the Pharmacy Order 2010 requires necessity for public protection, or an otherwise established public-interest basis. Necessity means that suspension should be imposed only where no other appropriate and proportionate remedy is available. The disciplinary body should therefore consider conditions before imposing suspension.
3. Whether conditions are sufficient depends on the complaint. Supervision and other conditions may be suitable for capability concerns or an honest mistake. They may be inadequate where the allegation is serious misconduct involving an apparently blatant breach of statutory requirements, particularly where conditions would not prevent repetition.
4. Unproven allegations need not first be proved before being considered in interim disciplinary proceedings. They must, however, be scrutinised with great care and their cogency assessed. The Committee had undertaken that exercise and was entitled to treat the alleged unlawful supply of prescription-only medicines as raising a public-safety issue.
5. On an appeal from a professional disciplinary body, the court exercises its statutory jurisdiction and does not simply conduct judicial review. It gives appropriate respect and weight to the specialist body’s expertise, but reaches its own assessment. The court’s conclusions were independently reached and were fortified by the respect owed to the Committee’s decision.
6. The seriousness of the alleged conduct outweighed the appellant’s financial and reputational loss. The proposed conditions would not have provided an appropriate and proportionate response to the alleged supply of dangerous prescription-only medicines without the required safeguards.

• Fitness to Practise Committee: continued the appellant’s interim suspension by determination dated 27 May 2014.
• High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the appeal and continued the suspension from 15 July 2014 to 14 January 2015.