Ibrahim v Swansea University

A defamation claim requires publication to someone other than the claimant and evidence of publication. Statements that a person has experienced mental health difficulties, chronic fatigue syndrome or anxiety are not necessarily defamatory; the question is whether they would lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking members of society. Qualified privilege depends on a common and corresponding interest in the subject matter. It does not protect the accidental disclosure of confidential medical information concerning a third party where no such interest exists. Malice must be pleaded with particulars showing abuse of the privileged occasion. Defamation proceedings may also be struck out as an abuse of process where they cannot realistically vindicate reputation or provide compensation. Human-rights allegations must identify an arguable infringement and comply with an order requiring clarification.

The claimant, a former postgraduate student, sued Swansea University after its Student Cases Committee considered a supporting statement and an accidentally supplied medical letter relating to another student when deciding whether to extend his candidature. The university later upheld his academic appeal, apologised and offered assistance with transfer and reimbursement of tuition fees.

The claimant relied on alleged publications to the Committee, to himself and to the Home Office, together with unclear claims concerning human rights and freedom of expression. The university applied to strike out the claim under CPR 3.4(2) or for summary judgment under CPR 24.2. The issues included whether the publications were actionable, whether privilege or abuse of process applied, and whether any arguable human-rights cause of action had been formulated.

1. Disposition. The relevant statements of case were struck out because no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim had been disclosed, the proceedings constituted an abuse of process, and the claimant had failed to comply with the Master’s order requiring clarification.
2. Publication limited to the claimant cannot found an action in defamation. The alleged publication to the Home Office was unsupported by evidence and could not found a claim. Those aspects were therefore incapable of giving rise to a cause of action.
3. The words relied upon, namely that the claimant had suffered mental health difficulties, or that the medical letter referred to chronic fatigue syndrome and anxiety, were not capable of lowering the claimant in the eyes of right-thinking members of society. The claim relating to publication to the Committee therefore failed at the threshold.
4. Qualified privilege attaches to the occasion of publication. It requires a common and corresponding interest between the publisher and recipient in the subject matter. The School’s statement may have been relevant to the Committee’s task, but the medical letter concerned a different person and contained confidential third-party information. Its accidental supply did not create the necessary common interest.
5. A plea of malice must identify a case more consistent with malice than its absence. Generalised allegations are insufficient. Incompetence or negligence is qualitatively different from malice, which is tantamount to dishonesty. Any such plea would have failed on the facts.
6. Applying the abuse-of-process approach in Jameel (Yousef) v Dow Jones & Co Inc [2005] QB 946, the proceedings could not realistically achieve vindication or compensation for reputational injury. The claimant’s complaints were also being pursued before the Office of the Independent Adjudicator.
7. The references to Article 2 of a Convention protocol, Article 10, and public-authority status did not disclose an arguable cause of action. The claimant had not explained how the alleged rights were infringed, and vague allegations could not survive.