Warnes & Anor v Forge

In determining the natural and ordinary meaning of defamatory publications, the court must read each publication as a whole and in its context, considering the impression made on the hypothetical reasonable reader. Qualifying words such as “alleged” or “suspected” do not necessarily prevent an imputation of guilt where the publication, read overall, presents the conduct as established fact.

An imputation of mental illness may be defamatory where, in context, it is intended to persuade readers to ignore the claimant. The defence of honest opinion under Defamation Act 2013, section 3, fails where the words convey factual assertions or where no relevant facts are indicated on which an honest person could have held the opinion.

The claimants alleged that the defendant defamed them in three emails circulated to various recipients. The publications concerned alleged fraud, professional misconduct, dishonesty, interference with a police investigation, mental illness and the receipt of stolen property.

At a preliminary hearing, the court was required to determine the natural and ordinary meanings of the words, whether those meanings were defamatory, whether the words were statements of fact or opinion for the purposes of section 3(2) of the Defamation Act 2013, and, if opinions, whether their bases were indicated under section 3(3).

1. Meaning. The court determined the single natural and ordinary meaning of each publication by considering the publication as a whole, its immediate context, its manner of publication and the impression it made on the hypothetical reasonable reader. The reader is neither naïve nor avid for scandal, but may read between the lines. The publisher’s intention is irrelevant.
2. The first email conveyed that the first claimant was exceptionally dishonest and had committed fraud; that the second claimant had negligently failed to notice an overspend, pursued a dishonest vendetta against Amax and its owner, sought to deflect responsibility, and was mentally ill and should not be listened to. The second email conveyed that the first claimant was guilty of fraud causing losses estimated at over £100,000. It conveyed that the second claimant had interfered with the police investigation, negligently failed to notice fraud on his watch, and dishonestly refused to accept the first claimant’s guilt. The third email conveyed that the first claimant stole data and that the second claimant received stolen property, thereby committing criminal offences.
3. Words such as “alleged” and “suspected” did not qualify the imputations sufficiently to prevent them conveying guilt. Their effect was negated by the surrounding assertions, the emphasis placed on compelling evidence, and the treatment of the alleged fraud as fact.
4. An imputation of mental illness is not incapable of being defamatory as a matter of law. Its defamatory character depends on context. Here, the words were capable of persuading professional contacts and others to ignore the second claimant because he was said to be mentally deranged and in need of psychiatric help. They were therefore capable of causing ostracism.
5. The meanings found were defamatory. The defence of honest opinion failed. The publications conveyed factual assertions, not opinions. Alternatively, the defendant had not identified relevant facts capable of satisfying section 3(4)(a) of the Defamation Act 2013.