D v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis

Under Human Rights Act 1998, s 7(5)(b), the court may extend the usual one-year period where it is equitable to do so, having regard to all the circumstances. The discretion is broad and distinct from ordinary limitation rules. On appeal, the court reviews rather than rehearses the decision and intervenes only where the first-instance decision was wrong. Important and credible evidence explaining delay may justify setting the decision aside and exercising the discretion afresh.

D appealed against Master Leslie’s refusal to extend time for a claim under s 7(5)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998. The proposed claim concerned alleged failures by the police to investigate a rape complaint effectively, said to engage Article 3 of the Convention. Proceedings were issued approximately five years after the underlying events.

The Master focused on delay after March 2009, when an IPCC report and developing Strasbourg jurisprudence had clarified the potential claim. D relied on further evidence concerning anonymity, legal representation and legal funding. The issues were whether the Master’s exercise of discretion was wrong and whether an extension was equitable.

1. Appeal allowed. The claimant’s time for bringing proceedings was extended.

2. An appeal from a master exercising a broad discretion is by way of review rather than rehearing. Intervention is justified only where the decision was wrong, including through legal misdirection, reliance on irrelevant factors or failure to consider relevant matters. Mere disagreement about the preferable outcome is insufficient.

3. The discretion under s 7(5)(b) requires consideration of all the circumstances and is distinct from the Limitation Act 1980. The one-year period is not an inflexible rule requiring immediate issue once relevant information becomes available.

4. The Master’s conclusion rested solely on the claimant’s decision to await legal funding before issuing the claim. Evidence explaining the need for anonymity and legal representation was important and credible under Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489. The Master was wrong to penalise the claimant for awaiting the funding decision, so the discretion could be exercised afresh.

5. Considering the claimant’s personal circumstances, the reasons for delay, the balance of prejudice and the availability of documentary evidence, it was equitable to extend time in the unusual circumstances of the case.

1. High Court (Queen's Bench Division): Appeal from Master Leslie’s order of 3 November 2011 allowed; time extended for bringing the proceedings.