London College of Business Ltd v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

A Tier 4 sponsor licence is not itself a possession under Article 1 of Protocol 1. Interference arises only where suspension or revocation adversely affects the business’s marketable goodwill. Suspension is an interim regulatory measure. Its lawfulness is assessed by reference to the sponsor duties, the applicable guidance, and the evidence available to the decision-maker at the time. A decision is not irrational merely because later evidence offers a different explanation. However, a suspension cannot lawfully be maintained beyond the period allowed by the guidance for considering representations, or for reasons unrelated to the suspension.

The claimant, a higher-education college serving predominantly non-EEA students, claimed damages against the Secretary of State for alleged breaches of Article 1 of Protocol 1 arising from three suspensions of its Tier 4 sponsor licence, its subsequent revocation, and delays in reviewing or lifting the suspensions. The claim had begun as judicial review proceedings and was transferred to the Queen’s Bench Division as a damages claim.

The Secretary of State accepted that the revocation was unlawful on public-law grounds. The court therefore determined liability in relation to the suspensions, the delays in lifting them, limitation under section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998, and the alleged continuing nature of the conduct.

1. 2012 suspension. The Secretary of State was entitled under the Tier 4 guidance to suspend where there was reason to believe that sponsorship duties were being breached or immigration control was threatened. The evidence that the college had made no reports through the Sponsor Management System, together with the apparent closure of the Birmingham campus and the related reporting obligations, provided a rational basis for suspension. The later explanations advanced by the college did not make the decision irrational. The intelligence and Sky News allegations affected the timing of the decision, but the evidence did not establish that they were the grounds for it. The suspension was neither Wednesbury unreasonable nor procedurally unfair.
2. The delay in lifting the 2012 suspension was unlawful. The decision was not made within the 28-day period in the guidance, and the admitted reason for delay was unrelated to consideration of the claimant’s representations.
3. 2013 suspension. The college’s weak financial position did not itself constitute a breach of sponsor duties. Although that position could potentially support a rational concern about immigration control, the evidence showed that matters beyond the grounds stated in the suspension letter, including the criminal investigation and reputational concerns, influenced the decision. The suspension was therefore unlawful. The failure to lift it within 28 days of the claimant’s representations was also unlawful.
4. 2014 suspension. The reasoning that students’ invalid or questionable ETS results showed that the college had contributed to their immigration journeys in order to obtain sponsorship was irrational because sponsorship had preceded the tests. Once that reasoning was disregarded, the remaining concerns about attendance, assessment of academic progression, and failure to retain interview records were sufficient to make suspension rational. The suspension was therefore lawful, but its continuation became unlawful by early 2015 when the defendant should have reconsidered the material supplied.
5. Limitation. The suspensions were separate and discrete acts, not one continuing act merely because the defendant maintained an evolving body of intelligence. Any claim concerning the 2012 or 2013 suspension was out of time. An extension under section 7(5)(b) was not justified because no proper application or evidence had been advanced. The court also observed that, had it been necessary, the earlier withdrawal of judicial review proceedings would have made claims concerning the 2012 and 2013 suspensions abusive.

Not an appeal. The claim originated as judicial review proceedings, was amended to include an Article 1 of Protocol 1 damages claim, and was transferred by consent to the Queen’s Bench Division. The court determined liability as a preliminary issue.