Ansari v Knowles & Ors

A settlement with one alleged joint tortfeasor does not automatically release or satisfy claims against others. The settlement must be construed by ordinary principles, in its factual context, with regard to the parties’ intentions and the Convention rights engaged. Any former rigidity in the rule concerning releases of joint tortfeasors has been substantially eroded. The central question is whether the agreement was intended to release the other defendants or to represent full satisfaction for the relevant harm. A settlement does not preclude further proceedings merely because it may have provided some compensation, particularly where issues of justification, malice, reputation and injunctive relief remain live. Continuing a defamation claim is not an abuse of process where it retains a legitimate potential to vindicate reputation and test serious allegations.

The claimant brought defamation proceedings against four defendants arising from publications alleging professional incompetence and serious misconduct. He settled his claims against the fourth defendant, Vilnius University, under a Tomlin order, receiving £112,500 and agreeing a statement in open court. The first and second defendants argued that the settlement released or fully satisfied the claimant’s claims against them as alleged joint tortfeasors, or alternatively that continuation of those claims was an abuse of process.

The preliminary issue concerned the effect of the settlement on claims relating to the Vilnius Memorandum, including claims against the first defendant as alleged co-author and for republication. The court also considered whether the continuing issues of justification and malice gave the claimant a legitimate purpose in pursuing the litigation.

1. Settlement and release. The settlement did not release any cause of action against the first or second defendants. The distinction between a release and a covenant not to sue is now an arid and technical one. The agreement had to be construed using ordinary principles and in its factual context. It was not plain that the claimant intended the settlement with the fourth defendant to operate as a release of the other alleged joint tortfeasors.
2. The settlement expressly concerned claims against the fourth defendant and also included a separate email claim unrelated to the first and second defendants. Neither defendant had been involved in the negotiations. The outstanding pleas of justification and malice, the claim for an injunction, the admitted republications, and the possibility of contribution all pointed away from an intention to extinguish their liability.
3. Satisfaction. The settlement did not establish that the claimant had received full satisfaction for the harm caused by the Vilnius Memorandum. The principle against double recovery applied, but the relevant inquiry was whether the settlement, properly construed, was intended to represent full satisfaction of the tort. That was a contextual question. The present case involved one action against all alleged tortfeasors, so concerns about successive litigation and finality had less force.
4. Abuse of process. Continuing the claims was not an abuse of process under the approach in Jameel (Yousef) v Dow Jones Inc [2005] QB 946. The unresolved defences of justification and malice meant that the proceedings retained a legitimate potential to vindicate the claimant’s reputation and test serious allegations. The settlement statement did not provide compelling vindication, particularly while the first and second defendants continued to justify the allegations and their pleadings were publicly accessible under CPR 5.4.
5. The questions in the preliminary issue were answered in the negative.