Pomiechowski v The District Court In Legnica, 59-220 Poland

For the purposes of Part 1 of the Extradition Act 2003, a European arrest warrant may contain both accusation and conviction matters. The statutory use of “or” identifies different information requirements; it does not require separate warrants. Particulars of conviction must be assessed by reference to the totality of the warrant and without unnecessary technicality. The information must sufficiently identify what the requested person faces and enable consideration of possible bars to extradition. Passage of time is a bar only where extradition would be unjust and oppressive. A person who has fled the requesting jurisdiction cannot ordinarily rely on subsequent delay, and ordinary hardship caused by extradition does not amount to oppression.

The claimant appealed against an order of the City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court dated 2 March 2011 ordering his extradition to Poland under two European arrest warrants. One warrant concerned four convictions and an accusation involving three offences. The other concerned an accusation. The claimant argued that the first warrant lacked the particulars required by section 2 of the Extradition Act 2003, that a warrant could not combine conviction and accusation matters, and that extradition was barred by passage of time.

The appeal had previously been held out of time in the Administrative Court, but the Supreme Court remitted it for determination. The central issues were whether the warrants complied with section 2 and whether the passage of time made extradition unjust and oppressive.

The appeal was dismissed in relation to both European arrest warrants.

1. Particulars. Section 2 of the Extradition Act 2003 was fully satisfied. The first warrant, read as a whole, provided proper particulars of four convictions and sufficient detail of the accusation case. The case references, conviction and sentence information, offence descriptions, limitation information and other entries in the warrant made clear which matters were convictions and which concerned an accusation.

2. The statutory requirement is not defeated by the absence of a particular item of information, such as the date of conviction, where the totality of the warrant supplies the necessary particulars. The question must be considered in the round and without unnecessary technicality. The requested person must nevertheless be sufficiently informed to understand what he faces on return and to formulate arguments resisting extradition.

3. Mixed warrants. Following Ciesielski v District Court in Kalisz, Poland and Zacharski v Regional Court in Lubin, Poland, the court held that Part 1 does not prohibit a single European arrest warrant from containing both accusation and conviction matters. The word “or” in section 2 indicates that the requirements for the two types of case differ. The Framework Decision and its pro forma warrant are consistent with their inclusion in one warrant, provided the matters are sufficiently identified.

4. The court accepted, without deciding, that the statutory scheme might produce an anomalous result if conviction matters failed the section 20 requirements while the accusation matters remained valid. That possibility did not justify extending the anomaly so as to prohibit all mixed warrants.

5. Passage of time. Under sections 11(1)(c) and 14, the question is whether extradition would be unjust and oppressive by reason of the time since the alleged offence or since the person became unlawfully at large. “Unjust” principally concerns prejudice to the accused and the fairness of the trial. “Oppressive” concerns hardship arising from changes in the accused’s circumstances, although the concepts may overlap.

6. The claimant was to be treated as a fugitive after leaving Poland. Applying Gomes v Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, he could not rely on delay after that point in relation to the convictions. The decade spent in the United Kingdom, the claimant’s changed circumstances and the hardship of return did not establish oppression. The appeal therefore failed on every ground.

1. Supreme Court: the issue whether the appeal was in time was resolved in the claimant’s favour and the appeal was remitted to the High Court.
2. High Court (Administrative Court): the earlier order of the City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court was upheld and the appeal against extradition was dismissed. The judgment appealed from is not separately cited in the judgment.