Afolabi v Solicitors Regulation Authority

In assessing professional misconduct, the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal may consider the practitioner’s conduct as a whole. Striking off may be appropriate where conduct demonstrates a lack of integrity, probity or trustworthiness, even without a proven finding of dishonesty and even where the conduct was outside legal practice. The tribunal’s expert assessment of the protection required for the public and the profession attracts particular respect. An appellate court should intervene in costs decisions only where the tribunal has exceeded the broad discretion conferred by the Solicitors Act 1974.

The appellant appealed under section 49(1)(b) of the Solicitors Act 1974 against a Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal order striking her off the Roll. The tribunal had found allegations concerning misleading publicity and the improper description of a business as a solicitors’ partnership proved. On a later hearing, following an earlier remittal by Holman J, it also found a reduced money-laundering allegation proved, while dismissing an allegation of dishonest evidence.

The appellant challenged the severity of the sanction and the orders for costs. The central issues were whether striking off was disproportionate in the absence of an express finding of dishonesty, and whether the tribunal had exceeded its discretion in apportioning costs.

Appeal dismissed.

1. The tribunal was entitled to assess the appellant’s conduct in the round. The misleading presentation of the firm and the money-laundering convictions each raised concerns about integrity and trustworthiness, and it was inappropriate to view them in isolation.
2. Applying Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 W.L.R. 512, the purpose of professional disciplinary sanctions is not necessarily punishment. It may be protection of the public and preservation of confidence in the profession. Striking off may therefore be justified even where the criminal penalty has been served and dishonesty has not been expressly found.
3. The absence of dishonesty as an ingredient of the money-laundering offences did not materially reduce the seriousness of the conduct. The sentencing judge’s findings showed that the appellant knew that money she received derived from her husband’s fraud. Conduct outside professional practice may nevertheless undermine confidence in the integrity and trustworthiness of a solicitor.
4. The tribunal’s assessment deserved particular respect because of its expert role in determining the sanction necessary to protect the public and the profession: Salsbury v Law Society [2008] EWCA Civ 1285; [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1286. The tribunal had committed no error of principle and striking off was not excessive.
5. Taylor (No. 10501-2010) was distinguishable. The appellant’s conduct involved two offences, a prolonged course of conduct, personal benefit, knowledge of the fraudulent source of the money, and the additional misconduct concerning the sham partnership.
6. Under section 47(2) of the Solicitors Act 1974, the tribunal had a broad discretion as to costs. The court should be slow to interfere. The original costs order was within the tribunal’s discretion, and the SRA had not acted improperly in pursuing the remitted allegation: Baxendale-Walker v Law Society [2007] EWCA Civ 233; [2008] 1 W.L.R. 426.

• Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal: found allegations A, B and, on the later hearing, reduced allegation M proved; dismissed allegation I; ordered that the appellant be struck off and pay specified costs.
• High Court, Holman J: upheld findings on allegations A and B, set aside the finding on allegation I, remitted that allegation to a differently constituted tribunal, and set aside the strike-off and costs orders for reconsideration.
• High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the appeal and upheld the strike-off and costs decisions.