Jeeg Global Ltd v Hare

Defamation proceedings may constitute an abuse of process where they serve no legitimate purpose in protecting reputation. However, a single publication and the absence of a claim for damages do not automatically justify striking out a claim. Where an injunction is sought, the relevant question is whether there are objective grounds for apprehending a real risk of repetition and whether an injunction would be a necessary and proportionate preventative measure. The fact that the words were spoken is only one factor. A contractual undertaking may be insufficient where the surrounding evidence supports a real risk of further publication. Failures to give notice of an without-notice injunction application are serious and may affect continuation of the injunction, but do not, by themselves, make the substantive claim an abuse of process.

The claimant, a business purchasing gold jewellery and precious metals, alleged that the defendant had told a jeweller that the claimant was in administration or was about to enter administration. An injunction was granted without notice by Vos J. Norris J later adjourned the application to continue the injunction, transferred the claim to the Queen’s Bench Division and directed the parties to seek a hearing.

The defendant applied to strike out the claim as an abuse of process. There had been only one alleged publication, the publishee did not believe the words, and no damages were claimed. The claimant relied on the alleged publication, evidence of aggressive conduct and a continuing risk of repetition. The central issue was whether there was a real and substantial prospect of a final injunction, such that the proceedings served a legitimate purpose.

1. Application refused. The claim was not struck out as an abuse of process.
2. The principle in Jameel v Dow Jones & Co Inc [2005] QB 946 requires the court to stop defamation proceedings which do not serve the legitimate purpose of protecting reputation. That principle is not confined to a de minimis assessment of damages. It requires a proper balance between reputation and freedom of expression.
3. The decisive question was whether, assuming that the words were spoken and that the defendant had behaved as alleged, there was a real and substantial prospect of a trial court granting a final injunction. The court had to assess whether there were objective grounds for apprehending a real risk of repetition and whether an injunction would be necessary and proportionate. Proof of the original publication was only one relevant factor.
4. The case was distinguishable from Citation Plc v Ellis Whittam Ltd [2012] EWHC 549 (QB) because the claimant relied on an alleged vendetta, aggressive and threatening behaviour, and a continuing risk of publication. If those matters were proved, the court could conclude that the defendant’s contractual undertaking did not sufficiently protect the claimant.
5. The principles concerning final injunctions stated by Fry LJ in Proctor v Bayley (1889) 42 Ch D 390 were applicable: an injunction is preventive, and requires grounds for apprehending repetition of the wrongful act.
6. Non-compliance with the notice requirements in CPR Part 25.3(3), Practice Direction 25A paragraph 4.3(3) and Human Rights Act 1998, section 12(2) and (3), was serious. It might justify refusing continuation of the injunction, but did not itself make the claim an abuse of process. A court could not accept an undertaking in proceedings which it was striking out, although it could stay proceedings on terms including an undertaking to the court.

The judgment was a first-instance decision on the defendant’s strike-out application. The judgment records that Vos J granted an interim injunction without notice and that Norris J adjourned the application to continue it and transferred the claim to the Queen’s Bench Division.