Cammish v Hughes

In a libel action, the court must determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the words as a reasonable reader would understand them in their publication context. A defamatory imputation may concern both business competence and suitability for a public role. The seriousness threshold concerns the potential effect of the words, not proof that actual damage occurred. Even where that threshold is met, proceedings may be abusive if they serve no legitimate purpose, applying the question whether the game is worth the candle. However, relatively modest damages do not automatically justify strike-out. Vindication may remain a legitimate purpose, particularly where the defendant has maintained a serious falsehood and has offered no retraction or explanation.

The claimant brought a libel action concerning anonymous material alleging that he had dissolved numerous companies because he could not run or sell them. The defendant admitted authorship in the Defence but denied defamation and relied on honest comment and abuse of process principles. He applied to prevent the claim proceeding on the basis that the words were insufficiently serious and that the litigation was disproportionate. The claimant also sought permission to amend to allege a later publication. The central issues were the meaning and defamatory character of the words, whether the claim should be struck out as abusive, and whether the proposed further publication had a viable evidential basis.

1. Meaning. The words were to be read by a reasonable recipient in the context of the anonymous package, the dispute over the proposed development, and the claimant’s asserted role as a businessperson and protest leader. Their natural and ordinary meaning was that the claimant had been unable to run companies, had therefore dissolved them, was a seriously incompetent businessman, and was not fit to advise protesters on running their protest.
2. Defamatory meaning and seriousness. The imputation was a business or professional libel. It attacked qualities relevant to the claimant’s business reputation and public role, and raised serious questions about his creditworthiness. Applying the approach in Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Limited [2010] EWHC 1414 (QB), the words passed the seriousness threshold. Actual damage was not a prerequisite.
3. Abuse of process. The court considered the principles in Jameel v Dow Jones & Co Inc [2005] EWCA Civ 75. The “game is worth the candle” jurisdiction is available where proceedings otherwise properly brought should not continue for practical or public-policy reasons. It does not mean that every libel attracting modest damages must be struck out. The deliberate publication, the claimant’s local reputation, the potential persistence of defamatory material, and the defendant’s continued refusal to explain or retract the authorship lie meant that vindication remained a legitimate purpose.
4. The Jameel application was dismissed. The proposed amendment alleging republication to Owain Davies and Linden Jenkins was unsupported by sufficient evidence and was dismissed. Permission was granted by consent to amend two other paragraphs.