Joseph Stewart Celine v The State of Mauritius (Mauritius)

A breach of the constitutional reasonable-time guarantee does not, by itself, require a conviction to be quashed or proceedings stayed. The court must ask whether the hearing was unfair or whether it was unfair to try the defendant at all. The whole period from initial caution to final disposal is relevant. A defendant’s failure to oppose adjournments cannot cure the breach, although conduct may affect sentence. Where delay is grossly excessive, imprisonment should be imposed only if the public interest affirmatively requires it. Serious offending, previous convictions, the defendant’s conduct and the effect of delayed imprisonment may inform that assessment. The proper remedy may be a substantial reduction in sentence rather than quashing the conviction.

Joseph Celine was convicted in Mauritius of four counts involving forgery and the use of forged documents. The Intermediate Court imposed three years’ penal servitude. The Supreme Court dismissed his appeal against conviction but reduced the sentence to eighteen months’ imprisonment.

After granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court granted an extension of time on one ground concerning whether the delay since the alleged offences made continued custody contrary to section 10 of the Constitution. The State accepted that the reasonable-time guarantee had been breached but disputed the extent of its responsibility and the appropriate remedy. The central issues were whether the conviction should be quashed and what sentence should now be imposed.

Lord Kerr delivered the judgment of the Board. The appeal succeeded only to the extent that the sentence was reduced; the conviction was maintained.

1. Delay. The relevant period ran from the appellant’s caution to the final disposal of the proceedings. The effect of the overall delay had to be considered, including periods that had previously been treated as concluded or were not accepted by the State. The State was responsible for substantially more than the three years identified by its counsel. The appellant’s passivity or failure to oppose adjournments could not excuse the breach of the reasonable-time guarantee, although his attitude was relevant to sentence.
2. Remedy for the breach. Applying Boolell v The State [2006] UKPC 46, delay alone did not justify staying the proceedings or quashing the conviction. That remedy required an unfair hearing or unfairness in trying the defendant. The witnesses’ use of documents to refresh their memories was neither inadmissible nor shown to be unfair, and the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Dahall v The State (1993) MR 220 was distinguishable because that case involved the appellant’s vague recollection of the relevant events.
3. Sentence. The Board considered whether the public interest affirmatively required custody despite the delay. The offences involved significant fraud, and the appellant had three previous convictions for dishonesty. Those matters outweighed the mitigating effect of his conduct and the delay for the purpose of deciding whether custody remained necessary. Nevertheless, the delay was grossly excessive and the appellant faced imprisonment at a much older age than if the proceedings had been expeditious. The sentence was therefore substituted with nine months’ imprisonment. The parties were directed to make written submissions on costs within 28 days.

• Privy Council: In [2012] UKPC 32, extended time for one ground of appeal, upheld the conviction and substituted a sentence of nine months’ imprisonment for the eighteen-month sentence imposed below.
• Supreme Court of Mauritius: On 12 February 2008, dismissed the appeal against conviction but reduced the sentence from three years to eighteen months’ imprisonment. Leave to appeal to the Privy Council was granted on 10 August 2009.
• Intermediate Court of Mauritius: Convicted the appellant on four counts on 2 March 2006 and imposed three years’ penal servitude.