The Presidential Insurance Company Limited v Resha St Hill (Trinidad and Tobago)

Section 4(7) of the Motor Vehicle Insurance (Third Party Risks) Act gives persons within the policy’s stated cover a statutory right to enforce the indemnity. It does not require an insurer to indemnify a driver whose liability the policy does not purport to cover merely because the policyholder consented to the driving. The statutory reference to persons driving or using the vehicle with consent must be read with the concluding words referring to liability which the policy purports to cover. Legislative history may identify statutory background and mischief, but ministerial statements cannot determine meaning under Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593 unless the required conditions are met. Where they are not, the natural meaning of the enacted text prevails.

The respondent was injured as a passenger in a motor accident caused by a driver who had the owner’s consent to use the vehicle. The appellant insurer had issued a policy limited expressly to the policyholder and a named driver. The respondent relied on section 4(7) of the Motor Vehicle Insurance (Third Party Risks) Act to claim indemnity from the insurer.

Gregory Smith J struck out the insurer’s defence on 25 July 2008. The Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago upheld that decision on 15 February 2011. The issue before the Privy Council was whether the amended section 4(7) made the insurer liable despite the policy’s limitation of authorised drivers.

1. Appeal allowed. The judgment for the respondent was set aside and the appellant’s defence was restored. The Board deferred the costs decision to allow submissions on whether the respondent’s costs should nevertheless be paid because the appeal was a test case.
2. Lord Mance, delivering the judgment of the Board, held that section 4(7) must be read as a whole. The concluding words referring to liability covered in the case of those persons naturally refer to both the person insured and persons driving or using the vehicle or licensed trailer with that person’s consent. The person insured ordinarily means the policyholder who took out and paid for the insurance.
3. Section 4(7) facilitates enforcement of an indemnity undertaken by the insurer under the policy. It does not impose liability for risks or persons which the policy does not purport to cover. The Board therefore rejected the construction accepted by the courts below and in Benjamin v Jairam, under which consent alone brought every driver within the compulsory indemnity despite a named-driver limitation.
4. The wider statutory scheme supported that construction. Sections 8 and 12 expressly invalidate specified policy restrictions and preserve recovery rights in defined circumstances. Section 4A expressly expands liability by deeming the owner of a hire vehicle to be the driver’s employer. Those provisions indicated that a wider compulsory liability required clear statutory language.
5. The Board considered Hansard under the principles stated in Gopaul v Iman Bakash [2012] UKPC 1, R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56 and Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593. The parliamentary explanations were unclear and substantially related to section 4A. The conditions for relying on ministerial statements were not met, and the natural meaning of the enacted text prevailed.

• Privy Council: Appeal allowed under [2012] UKPC 33; the judgment for the respondent was set aside and the appellant’s defence restored.
• Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago: On 15 February 2011, Mendonca, Bereaux and Narine JJA upheld the decision of Gregory Smith J.
• High Court of Trinidad and Tobago: Gregory Smith J struck out the appellant’s defence on 25 July 2008.