Margate Town Centre Regeneration Company Ltd & Ors v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor

A compulsory purchase order requires a compelling case in the public interest. Its interference with private rights must be justified by sufficient reasons, but a challenge under section 23 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 does not permit the court to reconsider the merits.

Operational viability may properly be inferred from an acquiring authority’s firm commitment, available funding, a prudent business plan and substantial third-party financial support. Minor factual inaccuracies do not invalidate the decision. Even a potentially misleading statement will not justify quashing where the decision-maker would inevitably have reached the same conclusion on accurate information.

Thanet District Council obtained confirmation of a compulsory purchase order covering the whole Dreamland amusement park site in Margate. The Secretary of State adopted an inspector’s recommendation that there was a compelling case in the public interest for acquiring the land to implement a heritage amusement park and the wider regeneration of the site.

The landowners applied under section 23 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 to quash the order. HHJ Sycamore, sitting in the Administrative Court, dismissed the application. Their appeal concerned whether the inspector had materially misrepresented the operational viability of the Council’s scheme and whether regeneration could have been achieved through a voluntary transfer of part of the site without compulsory acquisition of the remainder.

1. The appeal was dismissed. A compulsory purchase order requires a compelling case in the public interest because of its serious interference with private property rights. The court’s function under section 23 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 was nevertheless supervisory. It could identify legal or procedural error but could not reconsider the planning merits.

2. The inspector gave cogent and sustainable reasons for finding the proposed heritage amusement park operationally viable. He was entitled to rely on the Council’s firm commitment and available funding, the cautious assessment of its business plan, and the substantial grants offered by public and charitable bodies. It was legitimate to infer that bodies committing substantial funds had carefully evaluated the scheme. Detailed differences between competing business plans largely concerned professional assumptions and judgment.

3. The inspector’s statement that three business plans addressed an amusement park was a minor infelicity. A fair reading of the report showed that only one concerned the Council’s final scheme and that the competing expert had challenged that scheme’s viability. The inspector’s assessment of the operational differences between the plans was a matter of judgment which could not be reopened by the court.

4. The inspector’s statement that the landowners’ negotiating position had not changed was potentially misleading. They had ceased to insist that development of the retained plots be agreed as a condition of transferring the principal park land for £1. The error was immaterial, however, because they still intended to retain and develop those plots.

5. The Council’s legitimate scheme and the applicable local policy required regeneration of the whole site, although the initial heritage works directly involved only part of it. Retaining the remaining plots would have prevented their use for overflow parking and special events and frustrated the Council’s longer-term objectives. The Secretary of State would inevitably have confirmed the order had the revised offer been described accurately. Elias LJ gave the judgment, with which Sir David Keene and Goldring LJ agreed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The landowners’ appeal was dismissed by [2013] EWCA Civ 1178. The court upheld the confirmation of the compulsory purchase order.
2. Administrative Court: HHJ Sycamore dismissed the landowners’ application under section 23 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 to quash the compulsory purchase order. No citation is stated in the judgment.