Wheeler v Gloucestershire Constabulary

Apportionment of responsibility for contributory negligence is an evaluative task. Under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, the court must reach a just and equitable allocation having regard to responsibility for the damage. Relevant considerations include the causative potency of each party’s negligence, their relative responsibilities and the resulting damage. The appellate court should be reluctant to interfere where the trial judge considered those matters and the apportionment was open on the evidence. A driver’s duty to guard against others’ negligence does not remove the independent duty to obey the speed limit. Equal apportionment may be upheld even where another judge might have attributed marginally greater blame to one party.

A road collision occurred when a police driver turned right into a police station without looking or stopping, while the oncoming driver was travelling at least 55 miles per hour in a 30 miles per hour area. The trial was confined to liability. HHJ Harrington found both drivers negligent and apportioned liability equally between them.

Mr Wheeler’s claim settled at an early stage. The appeal was advanced on Mr Curran’s behalf, and his insurers were permitted to intervene. The central issue was whether the equal apportionment was properly open on the findings and whether the trial judge had given sufficient reasons for it.

Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the equal apportionment of liability.

1. The appellate court is very reluctant to interfere with a trial judge’s apportionment of blame, particularly where the trial judge heard the witnesses. The principle was illustrated by Plum v Ayres and West and Wilkinson [2008] EWCA Civ 1005. The question was whether the 50/50 assessment was open to the judge, not whether another judge might have made a different allocation.
2. The statutory task under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 was to make a just and equitable assessment having regard to the claimant’s share in responsibility for the damage. That required consideration of the relative causative potency of the negligence, the responsibilities of the parties and the damage. The judge had regard to the high-velocity nature of the accident.
3. The submission that Mr Curran’s duty extended only to guarding against the negligence of others was rejected. He also had an independent duty to comply with the speed limit and not to drive at least 25 miles per hour above it. Mr Ford’s negligence was serious, but it was properly characterised as failure to look and failure to stop.
4. Grealis v Opuni [2003] EWCA Civ 177 did not require a different result. That case concerned an oncoming driver travelling in the 30s, whereas Mr Curran was travelling at least 55 miles per hour. The factual and evaluative distinction justified treating Mr Curran’s speed as materially negligent.
5. The trial judge’s final conclusion was expressed shortly, but his judgment showed that he had considered the issues, relative causative potency, the parties’ duties, responsibility and damage. The equal apportionment was therefore open on the evidence. The appeal was dismissed.

1. Gloucester County Court: In a liability-only trial, HHJ Harrington found both drivers negligent and apportioned liability equally.
2. High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division: The cover sheet identifies this as the court from which the appeal came, but no decision citation or substantive ruling at that stage is stated in the supplied judgment.
3. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The court dismissed the appeal and held that the 50/50 apportionment was open to the trial judge.