Grealis v Opuni

A breach of a statutory speed limit does not, without more, establish negligence or create a private civil remedy under road-traffic legislation. It may nevertheless be evidence of negligence, as may breach of the Highway Code. Where a driver approaches a junction and can see vehicles waiting to turn across his path, reasonable care requires anticipation that a vehicle may misjudge the available gap and adjustment of speed to permit stopping. If compliance with the limit would probably have avoided the collision, exceeding it in those circumstances is negligent. The claimant’s dangerous manoeuvre and failure to keep a proper lookout may still justify a substantially greater share of responsibility.

The appellant appealed from the dismissal of his claim for damages following a traffic accident. He had been riding a moped and turned right across the path of the respondent’s car at a junction. The respondent was travelling at approximately 37 to 39 miles per hour in a 30 miles per hour area. The trial judge found that the accident would probably have been avoided if the respondent had complied with the speed limit, but held that exceeding the limit did not establish negligence in the circumstances. The central issues were whether the respondent was negligent at common law and how responsibility should be apportioned.

1. Disposition. The appeal was allowed. Liability was apportioned 80 per cent to the appellant and 20 per cent to the respondent. The case was remitted to the Central London County Court for directions as to quantum, with costs subject to detailed assessment.
2. Statutory breach and negligence. Mantell LJ upheld the trial judge’s exposition of the law. Exceeding a statutory speed limit does not necessarily impute negligence, and road traffic legislation imposes public duties rather than a civil duty enforceable by an injured individual. The authorities referred to included Barna v Hudes Merchandising Corporation and Another [1962] CLR 321, Monk v Warbey [1935] 1 KB 75 and Clarke and wife v Brims [1947] 1 KB 497. That distinction does not prevent a breach of the speed limit, like a breach of the Highway Code, from providing evidence of negligence.
3. Application. The respondent could see vehicles waiting to turn across his path. A prudent driver should anticipate that the leading vehicle might misjudge the speed of oncoming traffic and should adjust speed to be able to stop. Compliance with the speed limit would probably have avoided the accident and imposed no significant hardship. In those circumstances, driving above the lawful limit was negligent.
4. Appellate approach and apportionment. Mantell LJ was entitled to differ from the trial judge because the conclusion involved drawing inferences from primary facts found by that judge. The findings about the parties’ speeds did not require disturbance and did not affect the result. The appellant’s corner-cutting manoeuvre, crossing of oncoming traffic and failure to keep a proper lookout justified 80 per cent responsibility. Mance and Kennedy LJJ agreed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division), [2003] EWCA Civ 177: allowed the appeal and apportioned liability 80 per cent to the appellant and 20 per cent to the respondent.
2. Central London County Court, His Honour Judge Roger Cooke, 6 March 2002: dismissed the appellant’s claim for damages.