M (Children), Re

An appellate court may interfere with fact-finding only where the decision is plainly wrong and falls outside the generous ambit of reasonable disagreement. It must respect the trial judge’s unique position in assessing credibility, demeanour and the weight of inconsistent evidence.

A judgment need explain its findings, conclusions and reasoning sufficiently to permit appellate review. It need not give reasons for every subsidiary reason unless an unresolved inconsistency makes the conclusion unsustainable. A witness’s exaggeration, lies or unreliable evidence on collateral matters does not prevent a finding that the core allegation is proved.

In private-law proceedings under the Children Act 1989, the Coventry County Court made six disputed findings of fact against the father. They included findings of rape and assault against the mother, physical discipline of the son, a sexualised remark concerning the daughter, the absence of malice in allegations concerning the daughter, and manipulation of the mother’s Facebook account.

The father appealed, contending that the findings were contrary to the weight of the evidence and that the judge had failed adequately to address the mother’s inconsistencies, exaggerations and other untruths. The central issue was whether the findings and the judge’s overall assessment of credibility were plainly wrong.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Ryder J held, with Rafferty LJ and Sullivan LJ agreeing, that none of the six challenged findings was plainly wrong. The first-instance judge’s conclusions remained within the generous ambit of reasonable disagreement.
2. An appellate court must accord substantial respect to a trial judge’s assessment of oral evidence. The judge has seen the witnesses and is uniquely placed to assess credibility, demeanour, themes in the evidence and family relationships. The principles in [1985] 1 WLR 647 and [1995] 2 FLR 765 therefore precluded the Court of Appeal from reweighing the evidence merely because the father’s alternative analysis was attractive.
3. The reasons were adequate. A judge need not give reasons for every subsidiary reason. The material question is whether the judgment sufficiently identifies the findings and conclusions and explains the reasoning process. Only a logically fatal inconsistency could make the acceptance of evidence plainly wrong.
4. The judge had permissibly assessed each allegation separately while retaining an overall view of both parties’ credibility. The mother’s exaggeration, inconsistency and unreliable evidence about collateral matters did not compel rejection of the core allegations. Conversely, the father’s changing account, admitted untruths and evasiveness could properly affect the weight given to his denials.
5. A criminal-law Lucas direction was neither required nor material. A lie may have an innocent explanation, and a fact-finder may nevertheless accept a material allegation despite lies on other matters. Further, a failure to prove an allegation does not establish its converse: a negative allegation also requires cogent proof. That latter observation arose outside the appeal grounds.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2013] EWCA Civ 388, the court dismissed the father’s appeal and upheld all six challenged findings of fact.
• Coventry County Court: HHJ Hilary Watson made the findings at a fact-finding hearing on 12 October 2012 in private-law children proceedings.