Roberts v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police

A broad full and final settlement clause may compromise statutory and human-rights claims based on facts occurring before the settlement date, even where the claimant later says that the claims were not then known to be viable. Characterising a retained police record as a continuing document does not avoid the compromise where the claims depend on pre-settlement facts. Once the claims have been compromised, limitation and substantive merits issues are academic. Permission to appeal was therefore refused.

Mr Nathan Roberts brought an action against the police which included a defamation claim. It was settled by agreement incorporated in a Tomlin Order dated 16 June 2011. He later brought a second action alleging breaches of the Data Protection Act and the Human Rights Act arising from the police’s retention of a nominal profile recording earlier encounters.

The Manchester County Court held that the settlement clause compromised all claims based on facts occurring before the agreement. The judge also considered, alternatively, whether the human-rights claims were out of time and whether the claims could be substantiated. Jackson LJ refused permission to appeal on the papers. The issue before Longmore LJ was whether the second action had been compromised by the settlement and, if not, whether the alternative limitation and merits issues justified an appeal.

Disposition

The application for permission to appeal was refused.

1. The settlement clause provided for full and final satisfaction of the claims in the first action and of any claim or potential claim against the police arising under statute, common law or otherwise up to the date of the agreement. Longmore LJ held that the wording was wide enough to cover claims under the Data Protection Act and the Human Rights Act based on facts occurring before 16 June 2011.
2. The fact that the claimant did not know whether those claims were legally good when the first action was settled did not prevent their compromise. Nor did the description of the nominal profile as a living document preserve claims founded on pre-settlement facts. The agreed deletions and compensation resolved those potential infringements.
3. The judge’s conclusion that the claims had been settled was one which the Court of Appeal would inevitably reach on a full appeal. There was consequently no realistic basis for granting permission.
4. Longmore LJ considered the alternative arguments concerning the one-year limitation period for the human-rights claims and the substantive issues addressed by the county court. He could see no apparent error in the judge’s decisions, but those issues were academic because the claims had already been compromised.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — On the renewed application for permission to appeal, Longmore LJ refused permission: [2013] EWCA Civ 60.
• Manchester County Court — HHJ Armitage QC held on 24 August 2012 that the second action had been compromised by the Tomlin Order and dismissed the claim. He also considered limitation and substantive issues alternatively.
• Court of Appeal on the papers — Jackson LJ had previously refused permission to appeal.