Starks v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire

In assessing relative responsibility for a collision at a mini-roundabout, formal priority is not decisive where the proximity and speed of approaching vehicles make the issue one of judgment. Each driver must approach at a moderate speed, observe the other vehicle and be prepared to stop if there is doubt. A driver must comply with the Highway Code requirement to pass around the central markings; habitual non-compliance does not make the breach non-culpable. A driver who enters first may still be seriously at fault for misjudging an approaching vehicle, but may ordinarily expect a vehicle approaching at an inappropriate speed to slow for the roundabout. Apportionment under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 requires consideration of both culpability and causal potency.

The appellant’s car collided with a police car at a mini-roundabout. Both drivers were approaching the junction in darkness but had adequate visibility. The appellant entered marginally first while turning right. The police car approached at 30 mph, crossed directly over the roundel and collided with the appellant’s vehicle.

At trial in the Cambridge County Court, the appellant was held 55% responsible and the police driver 45% responsible. The appeal concerned the proper assessment of relative culpability and causal potency, including whether formal priority under the Highway Code determined the apportionment.

1. Appeal allowed. Underhill LJ delivered the leading judgment, with Patten LJ and Moore-Bick LJ agreeing. The trial apportionment was set aside and responsibility was apportioned 65% to PC Richardson and 35% to the appellant.
2. Formal priority under paragraph 185 of the Highway Code was not decisive. On a mini-roundabout, a vehicle approaching from the right may be sufficiently close to be inconvenienced by another vehicle entering first. Where one vehicle is closer but the other is travelling faster, priority may not provide a clear answer. Each driver must approach at a moderate speed which permits stopping if necessary and must exercise judgment where the other driver’s intentions are uncertain.
3. PC Richardson plainly breached paragraph 188 of the Highway Code by ignoring the mini-roundabout and driving over its central markings. The fact that other drivers commonly did the same was irrelevant. She should have slowed to negotiate the junction properly and, having seen the appellant’s vehicle, should not have assumed that he would wait. A safe speed was substantially below 30 mph, approximately 20 mph or less.
4. The appellant was also seriously at fault. He misjudged the speed and distance of the approaching police car and entered its path. However, he was entitled to expect a vehicle approaching the junction at that speed to slow for the roundabout and comply with the applicable rules.
5. The apportionment exercise under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 requires assessment of both relative culpability and relative causal potency. Here there was no material distinction between the parties’ culpability and their responsibility for the damage. The evidence supported the conclusion that a substantial reduction in the police car’s speed would probably have avoided the collision or materially reduced its severity.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2013] EWCA Civ 782, the appeal from the Cambridge County Court was allowed. The trial apportionment of 55% responsibility to the appellant and 45% to the police driver was replaced by an apportionment of 35% and 65%, respectively.
• Cambridge County Court: Following the liability trial before Her Honour Judge Plumstead on 23 May 2012, the appellant was held 55% responsible and the police driver 45% responsible.