Saunders & Ors v R

A sentencing court must apply the sentencing regime in force when the offender was convicted. It must not anticipate later provisions before they come into force.

Under section 225 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, a discretionary life sentence depends on the statutory conditions, including the seriousness of the offending and public protection. Where imprisonment for public protection remained available and adequately protected the public, life imprisonment required the additional gravity that justified its denunciatory character.

After the abolition of imprisonment for public protection, a discretionary life sentence may be necessary where the new extended sentence cannot provide sufficient long-term protection. The denunciatory element is then not a prerequisite, although life imprisonment remains a sentence of last resort.

The court heard three linked appeals against non-mandatory life sentences imposed for offences committed before the changes made by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 came into force.

The first two appellants had committed grave and sustained sexual offences against young children. The third appellant had committed a series of planned knifepoint robberies of small businesses shortly after release on licence. Each challenged the appropriateness of a life sentence and, in some instances, the minimum term.

The central issues were whether the pre-LASPO sentencing regime applied, when a discretionary life sentence was justified, and whether an IPP sentence would have provided adequate public protection.

1. The appeals of Saunders and G were dismissed. Their offences were of the highest gravity and each appellant presented a very high and indefinite risk of serious harm to children. The life sentences and minimum terms fell within the proper sentencing range.

2. The appeal of Edwards was allowed to the limited extent that his concurrent life sentences were replaced by concurrent IPP sentences. His repeated knifepoint robberies created a real danger to the public, but an IPP sentence was available and provided the necessary protection. The robberies did not possess the exceptional denunciatory gravity required for a discretionary life sentence under the regime then in force. There was no basis to alter the eight-year minimum term.

3. For offenders convicted before 3 December 2012, the court must apply the earlier sentencing regime, even if sentence is imposed after that date. A court cannot anticipate later sentencing provisions: Attorney General’s Reference No 55 of 2008 (R v C) [2008] EWCA Crim 2790 was followed on that point.

4. The court explained that section 225 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 continued to require life imprisonment where its statutory conditions were established. The label “discretionary” distinguishes that sentence from mandatory life imprisonment for murder; it does not confer an unrestricted sentencing choice.

5. For convictions after the LASPO changes, the abolition of IPP means that a discretionary life sentence must be considered where an extended sentence cannot secure adequate long-term public protection. The denunciatory criterion identified in R v Wilkinson [2010] 1 Cr. App. R(S) 100 is not a prerequisite in that new context. Life imprisonment nevertheless remains a sentence of last resort.

6. The jurisdiction to impose life imprisonment in an appropriate case outside the statutory and section 225 categories survived both the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and LASPO.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — In Saunders & Ors v R [2013] EWCA Crim 1027, the court dismissed the appeals of Saunders and G, and substituted IPP sentences for Edwards’s life sentences.
• Central Criminal Court — HHJ Rook QC sentenced Saunders to life imprisonment on 23 November 2012.
• Canterbury Crown Court — HHJ Williams sentenced G to life imprisonment on 10 December 2012.
• Central Criminal Court — Mr Recorder Wood QC sentenced Edwards to concurrent life sentences on 7 December 2012.