Mula, R. v

A trial judge must leave self-defence to the jury where there is evidence which, if accepted, raises a prima facie case. That obligation can arise although the defendant’s own case is alibi and denies presence at the scene. Evidence from another source may support the defence.

The question is whether a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant acted in self-defence, or might have done so. If that threshold is met, the prosecution must negative the defence. A conviction is unsafe where the jury were not directed on such a potentially exculpatory defence.

The appellant was convicted, after a retrial at Snaresbrook Crown Court, of inflicting grievous bodily harm. The prosecution alleged that he punched the complainant following a road incident, causing a fractured jaw. The appellant’s case was alibi: he denied being at the scene.

There was, however, evidence from the complainant that he had approached the assailant holding a packet of sweets and that the assailant might have thought he was about to strike. The trial judge declined to leave self-defence to the jury because the appellant’s case was that he was elsewhere. The appeal concerned whether that direction should nevertheless have been given.

1. Appeal allowed. The conviction was quashed because the judge should have left self-defence to the jury. The court declined to order a further retrial.

2. The governing principle was that self-defence must be left where evidence, if accepted, is sufficient to raise a prima facie case. This remains so where the defendant asserts an alibi. The relevant evidence need not come from the defendant’s own account. The court followed the approach in Bonnick (1978) 66 Cr.App.R 266, which recognises that evidence of self-defence may exist despite a denial of presence.

3. The complainant’s evidence met that threshold. He had got out of his vehicle holding the sweets, approached the assailant, accepted that the assailant might have thought he was about to strike, and said that they had to be pulled apart. A reasonable jury could therefore have concluded, or might have concluded, that the appellant acted in self-defence.

4. The judge could not reject that possibility simply because the appellant denied being present. Presence was the prosecution case and was ultimately accepted by the jury. Once self-defence was properly raised, it was for the prosecution to negative it.

5. Although the evidence that the appellant was present was strong, it did not resolve whether the punch was delivered in self-defence. The jury had not considered a defence which might have led to an acquittal. The court could therefore not regard the verdict as safe.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and declined to order a further retrial: [2013] EWCA Crim 1293.

• Crown Court at Snaresbrook: Following a retrial, convicted the appellant of inflicting grievous bodily harm on 6 July 2012. On 13 August 2012, imposed 12 months’ imprisonment suspended for 24 months, a six-month curfew requirement, and compensation.