Case details
Summary
A direction encouraging discussion, argument or give and take must not cause jurors to compromise their oaths. A Watson direction should not normally be given before, or at the same time as, a majority-verdict direction. The decisive question is whether the judge’s words, in their particular context, created a significant risk of undue pressure on a juror or the jury to reach a verdict.
An inadvertent disclosure failure does not render a conviction unsafe unless the undisclosed material could materially affect the issue decided. A co-defendant’s generous credit for a guilty plea will rarely make unfair the sentence of a leading defendant who received no credit.
Factual background
The appellant was convicted at Southwark Crown Court of conspiracy to supply cocaine. He was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. He later pleaded guilty to conspiracies to defraud by false representation and to commit money laundering, for which concurrent sentences were imposed consecutively to the drugs sentence.
He appealed his drugs conviction on the ground that the trial judge’s majority-verdict direction improperly incorporated part of a Watson direction. He also sought leave to add a ground alleging unfairness through prosecution non-disclosure of further covert recordings. He renewed refused applications for leave to appeal both sets of sentences.
The central issues were whether the jury had been subjected to undue pressure, whether the disclosure failures could have affected the verdict, and whether the aggregate sentence was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.
Held
- The appeal against conviction was dismissed. Leave to advance the additional disclosure ground was refused, and the renewed applications for leave to appeal sentence were refused.
- The court reaffirmed the safeguards stated in Watson [1988] QB 690. A jury must deliberate free from pressure to agree contrary to conscience. A Watson direction is rarely needed and should not normally be given before or with a majority-verdict direction. The statutory availability of a majority verdict reduces, rather than renews, pressure to secure unanimity. The appellate question is whether the judge’s actual words, viewed in context, created a significant risk that a juror would compromise the oath or that the jury would feel compelled to return a verdict.
- The trial judge’s references to give and take were unnecessary and were again disapproved. However, the direction did not render the conviction unsafe. The judge made clear that there was no pressure of time, that deliberations could continue on the following week, and that a majority verdict was available only if the jury could not honestly reach unanimity. In context, the word “honestly” conveyed the need for conscientious deliberation. The judge was answering the jury’s question about the permitted majority; he was not suggesting that a verdict had to be returned.
- The non-disclosure was inadvertent, but none of the identified undisclosed recordings could materially affect whether the relied-on chains of conversations showed the appellant’s participation in the cocaine conspiracy. The jury had already been invited to assess words in their context and had heard the defence case that other, unrecorded or partially recorded conversations existed.
- Applying Caley [2012] EWCA Crim 2821, credit following an unsuccessful Newton hearing depends on the circumstances and remains for the sentencing judge. The generous credit given to Sales did not make the appellant’s 15-year sentence unfair. The fraud conspiracy was separate offending, and the consecutive sentence, reduced to reflect totality, was just and proportionate.
The court’s approach to earlier authorities
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Appellate history
- Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Dismissed the appeal against conviction, refused leave to advance the additional disclosure ground, and refused the renewed applications for leave to appeal sentence: [2013] EWCA Crim 1852.
- Southwark Crown Court Convicted the appellant of conspiracy to supply cocaine and imposed a 15-year sentence. In separate proceedings, imposed concurrent sentences for conspiracies to defraud and commit money laundering, consecutive to the drugs sentence.
Lower court decision
Key cases cited
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Cases citing this case
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