PT v R

A substantial delay in prosecution does not require a stay unless it has caused irremediable prejudice such that a fair trial is no longer possible. The court must assess whether evidential rulings, cross-examination and clear jury directions can fairly address the disadvantages caused by time.

Hearsay and historic interview evidence may be admitted where its reliability can be tested or assessed by adequate safeguards. Missing records, unavailable witnesses and prior acquittals do not of themselves make admission unfair. The decisive question is whether the trial as a whole remains fair and the resulting convictions safe.

The appellant was convicted at Chelmsford Crown Court before Owen J of historic sexual offences and the 1979 murder of Sally Ann McGrath. The trial took place more than 33 years after the events. The prosecution relied on complainants' evidence, evidence of other sexual allegations, statements from unavailable witnesses, alleged prison-cell admissions, and summaries of police interviews conducted in 1980.

With leave of the single judge, the appellant appealed against conviction. He contended that delay had made a fair trial impossible and that the judge should have excluded evidence of prior allegations, hearsay cell confessions, and the historic interview summaries. The central issue was whether the cumulative effect of delay and the challenged evidential rulings rendered the convictions unsafe.

1. Appeal against conviction dismissed. The court was firmly satisfied that the trial was fairly and properly conducted, that the jury's verdicts were amply justified by the evidence, and that the convictions were safe.

2. A stay for delay is exceptional. It requires prejudice to the defence which cannot fairly be addressed through the trial process. The prosecution bore responsibility for the delay, but there was no manipulation of process. The judge had properly considered the disadvantages arising from lost evidence, dead witnesses and fading memory, count by count, and had been entitled to conclude that they did not prevent a fair trial.

3. The judge's directions adequately addressed the consequences of delay and the risks in hearsay evidence. They explained the burden of proof, the absence of cross-examination of unavailable witnesses, and the need for considerable caution. The summing up also identified the material evidential gaps and inconsistencies relied on by the defence. The proposed additional complaint about directions was without merit and leave to advance it was refused.

4. Applying the approach explained in Riaz and others [2012] EWCA Crim 1509, hearsay was not automatically inadmissible because it was important to the prosecution case. The relevant question was whether the evidence was demonstrably reliable or whether the jury had sufficient means to assess its reliability. The challenged hearsay was either supported by other evidence, capable of testing through live witnesses, or favourable to the defence.

5. The evidence of allegations involving LB and AF was properly admitted notwithstanding the appellant's earlier acquittals. Under the principle in Z [2000] AC 483, the jury could use it in relation to other allegations only if sure of its truth and reliability. The absence of historic trial papers did not itself make the later trial unfair.

6. The historic interviews were admissible despite their pre-Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 form. The officers were available for cross-examination, the interviews were substantially self-serving or non-confessional, and the jury received an appropriate warning. The court also upheld admission, with editing and cautionary directions, of the cell-confession evidence.

7. The court quashed the unlawful nine-year sentence for attempted rape on count 4 and substituted a concurrent sentence of seven years' imprisonment. All other orders remained in force.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — In [2013] EWCA Crim 2398, dismissed the appeal against conviction as the trial and verdicts were fair and safe. It corrected the unlawful sentence imposed on count 4.
• Chelmsford Crown Court (Owen J) — In December 2012, the appellant was convicted by unanimous verdicts of rape, buggery, attempted rape and murder, and was sentenced to concurrent determinate sentences and life imprisonment with an 18-year minimum term.