B v R.

Under section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, a belief in consent must be reasonable by objective standards. A belief induced by delusional psychotic illness is irrational and cannot thereby become reasonable. Unless the defendant’s state of mind amounts to legal insanity, the mental disorder which produced such a belief is excluded from the assessment of reasonableness.

The court left open the possibility that a defendant’s abilities or personality may be relevant where a non-irrational belief turns on subtle social signals. Mental illness remains relevant to sentence. For common assault, a benevolent motive does not generally justify unwanted force. For criminal damage, an honestly held belief in the owner’s consent or hypothetical consent is sufficient even if unreasonable.

The appellant was convicted in the Crown Court at Chelmsford of two rapes, common assault and criminal damage against his partner. He was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and held delusional beliefs, including that he had healing powers. He did not give evidence, but psychiatric evidence was adduced.

On the rape counts, the trial judge directed the jury to disregard the mental illness when deciding whether any belief in consent was reasonable. On the assault count, he rejected a proposed direction that a belief that forced feeding would benefit the complainant prevented hostility. On criminal damage, he directed that an honestly held belief in consent sufficed even if unjustified.

The appeal challenged each direction, principally asking whether mental disorder can be considered when assessing reasonable belief in consent.

1. Appeal dismissed. The rape convictions were safe on the evidence. The psychiatric evidence did not support a possibility that the appellant mistook non-consensual submission for consent. It suggested instead that he might have thought he had reason to compel intercourse.

2. In any event, section 1(2) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 requires an objectively reasonable belief in consent. The statutory question is whether the belief was reasonable, not whether it was understandable or blameless for the defendant to have the mental condition which caused it. A delusional belief in consent is irrational and therefore cannot be reasonable. Unless the state of mind amounts to legal insanity, a delusional psychotic illness or personality disorder which induces an otherwise irrational belief is not taken into account in applying that objective standard.

3. The court did not exclude all personal characteristics from the inquiry. A case may arise where impaired intelligence or an inability to read subtle behavioural cues bears on a belief which is not itself irrational. That issue must be decided on its facts. Mental condition is also relevant to sentence.

4. The common-assault direction was correct. A desire to benefit another adult does not generally justify unwanted force, absent a genuine necessity such as saving life or preventing attack. The forced manipulation of the complainant’s finger to make her eat the mixture, if proved, was an assault.

5. For criminal damage, an honestly held belief that the owner consented, or would have consented if asked, provides lawful excuse even where unreasonable. A delusional belief can be genuinely held. The jury received a sufficient direction on that basis.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appeal against convictions entered in the Crown Court at Chelmsford.
• Crown Court at Chelmsford: the appellant was convicted of two counts of rape, common assault and criminal damage.